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PROSECUTING EXECUTIVE BRANCH WRONGDOING
Julian A. Cook, III *

ABSTRACT
Attorney General William Barr’s handling of Robert Mueller’s Report on the
Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election was
undeniably controversial and raised meaningful questions regarding the
impartiality of the Department of Justice. Yet, Barr’s conduct, which occurred at
the conclusion of the Mueller investigation, was merely the caboose at the end of a
series of controversies that were coupled together from the outset of the
investigation. Ensnarled in dissonance from its inception, the Mueller
investigation was dogged by controversies that ultimately compromised its
legitimacy.
Public trust of criminal investigations of executive branch wrongdoing requires
prosecutorial independence. To further this critical objective, an investigative and
prosecutorial structure must be implemented that grants a prosecutor sufficient
latitude to pursue independent investigations while reigning in the exercise of
runaway discretion. Indeed, at no time since Watergate has there been such a clear
need for reform.
This Article will explain why many of the controversies that beset the Mueller
investigation can be sourced to the Special Counsel regulations—the rules that
governed his appointment, as well as his investigative and prosecutorial
authority. And it will explain why many of these ills can be ameliorated by
enacting a modified and innovative version of the expired Independent Counsel
Statute.
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“[Robert Mueller’s] work concluded when he sent his report to the
attorney general. At that point, it was my baby.”
– William Barr,
Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
(May 1, 2019).

INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller (Mueller or
Special Counsel) delivered to United States Attorney General William Barr (Barr) his much-anticipated Report on the Investigation into
1
Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (the Report).
Two days later, on March 24, 2019, Barr sent a letter to members of
2
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The stated intent of the letter was
to provide a summary of the Report’s “principal conclusions” as
3
well as the status of Barr’s “initial review of the report.” The letter
noted, inter alia, that (1) the Report did not recommend addition1. Sharon LaFraniere & Katie Benner, Mueller Delivers Report on Trump-Russia Investigation to Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/
22/us/politics/mueller-report.html [https://perma.cc/8Z6C-WR58].
2. See Letter from William Barr, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Lindsey Graham, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and Doug Collins, Ranking Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 24, 2019), https://
www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1147981/download [https://perma.cc/P6Z4-DHR7].
3. Id.; see also Mark Mazzetti & Katie Benner, Mueller Finds No Trump-Russia Conspiracy,
but Stops Short of Exonerating President on Obstruction, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2019), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2019/03/24/us/politics/mueller-report-summary.html [https://
perma.cc/A9RP-XPQA].
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al indictments; (2) there were no sealed indictments; (3) the Report “did not find that the Trump campaign or anyone associated
with it conspired or coordinated with Russia in its efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election;” and (4) the Report failed
to reach a conclusion regarding whether President Donald Trump
4
(Trump) obstructed justice. As to obstruction, Barr noted that
while the Report “does not conclude that the President committed
5
a crime, it also does not exonerate him.”
Though Mueller failed to reach a conclusion on the question of
obstruction, Barr announced his own judgment: namely, that there
6
was insufficient evidence to establish the President’s guilt. Barr asserted that his opinion was not influenced by the open question
7
regarding a president’s indictability. Instead, he referenced the
absence of sufficient evidence linking Trump to an underlying
8
crime relating to Russian interference. This void, Barr argued,
9
bore upon the President’s intent to obstruct. Finally, Barr ad10
dressed the public release of the Report. He acknowledged the
intense public interest in the Report but cautioned against its precipitous release, citing the existence of grand jury protected mate11
rial that necessitated redactions.
Three days later, on March 27, 2019, Mueller sent a letter to
Barr in which he expressed his belief that Barr’s letter was misleading and had produced public uncertainty regarding the investiga12
tion. According to Mueller, this confusion “threatens to undermine a central purpose for which the Department [of Justice]
appointed the Special Counsel: to assure full public confidence in
13
the outcome of the investigations.” In addition, Mueller submitted documents to the Department of Justice (DOJ), suggesting that
their public release would provide context that would enhance
14
public understanding of the work of Mueller’s team.
4. Barr, supra note 2; see, e.g., Mazzetti & Benner, supra note 3.
5. Barr, supra note 2.
6. See Barr, supra note 2.
7. E.g., id.; Jan Wolfe, Can a Sitting U.S. President Face Criminal Charges?, REUTERS (Feb.
26, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-asitting-us-president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 [https://perma.cc/8LSR-68ZR]
(“[T]he Constitution is silent on whether a president can face criminal prosecution in court,
and the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question”).
8. See Barr, supra note 2.
9. See Barr, supra note 2.
10. See id.
11. E.g., id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), “which imposes restrictions on the use and
disclosure of information relating to ‘matter[s] occurring before [a] grand jury’ ”).
12. See Letter from Robert Mueller, Special Couns., Dep’t of Just., to William Barr, Att’y
Gen., Dep’t of Just. (Mar. 27, 2019) (on file with author).
13. Id.
14. Read: Mueller’s Letter to Barr, THE HILL (May 1, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy
/national-security/441547-read-muellers-letter-to-barr [https://perma.cc/WNF8-EXXY].
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On April 18, 2019, Barr released a redacted version of the Re15
port. The redacted Report—which exceeded 400 pages—
detailed, inter alia, ten instances of potential obstruction of justice
committed by President Trump (e.g., several attempts by Trump to
fire Mueller himself and also Attorney General Jeff Sessions), as
well as “multiple links” between Russian officials and the Trump
campaign (though it did not ultimately find sufficient evidence to
16
support a criminal conspiracy). On May 1, 2019, Barr appeared
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 17 During his five hour-long
testimony, Barr defended his own conclusion that President
Trump did not obstruct justice, expressed surprise that Mueller
failed to reach a conclusion on the obstruction question, defended
his summary of Mueller’s report, and claimed that the subsequent
release of the redacted report rendered Mueller’s objections
18
moot. Perhaps his most notable testimony came during an ex19
change with Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, when Barr made the
following statements regarding his decision to make the Mueller
report public:
Bob Mueller is the equivalent of a U.S. attorney. He was exercising the powers of the attorney general subject to the
supervision of the attorney general. He’s part of the Department of Justice. His work concluded when he sent his
report to the attorney general. At that point, it was my baby.
And I was making a decision as to whether or not to make it
pulic. . . . It was my decision how and when to make it pub20
lic, not Bob Mueller’s.
On the one hand, Barr’s testimony was technically correct. Under the Special Counsel Regulations as it then operated and still
15. Sarah Mervosh, ‘Redacted’ Is Word of the Day as the Mueller Report Lands, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/politics/redacted-muellerreport.html [https://perma.cc/8BPX-VM73].
16. Stefan Becket, Kathryn Watson, Will Rahn, Camilo Montoya-Galvez & Grace Segers,
Mueller Report Outlines Trump’s Attempts to Assert Control over Russia Probe, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/mueller-report-release-william-barrpress-conference-today-full-report-download-read-2019-04-18/ [https://perma.cc/JZ2VSVH4]; see also OFF. OF THE SPECIAL COUNS., DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019).
17. See, e.g., Chris Megerian & Del Quentin Wilber, Attorney General Barr Refuses to Testify
to House Panel After Contentious Senate Hearing, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-attorney-general-willliam-barr-senate-hearing20190501-story.html.
18. See id.
19. A Democratic Senator from Rhode Island.
20. Dylan Stableford, Barr Says Mueller Report ‘Was My Baby,’ Justifying Summary,
YAHOO!NEWS (May 1, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/barr-on-the-mueller-report-it-was-mybaby-163856879.html [https://perma.cc/FBS2-JF3Z].
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operates, Mueller was the equivalent of a U.S. Attorney so that all
of his actions were subject to the supervision of the Attorney Gen21
eral. Further, the decision of whether to make the Report public
22
rested with Barr, not Mueller.
Even so, Barr’s comments were widely panned—and understandably so. To critics, Barr’s remarks, and the context in which
they were made, represented an explicit example of a key presidential appointee being far too willing to stray into the investigative territory assigned to the Special Counsel precisely because of
23
the special characteristics of the case. Barr’s arguable manipulation of the contents of the Mueller Report fed the perception
among many that the DOJ had effectively undermined the integrity of the work of the Office of Special Counsel both in reality and
24
in appearance. Indeed, a POLITICO/Morning Consult poll released approximately one week after Barr’s testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that only twenty-nine percent of respondents believed that Barr handled the Mueller Report
25
properly. Notably, perceptions regarding the propriety of Barr’s
conduct around the release of the report were divided according
26
to party affiliation. Indeed, fifty-eight percent of Democrats believed that Barr acted to benefit Trump, while fifty-six percent of
Republicans believed that Barr simply sought to inform the public
21. See generally General Powers of Special Counsel, 28 C.F.R. § 600 (2019) (promulgating the duties, roles, and rules associated with the Special Counsel).
22. Id.
23. See Lisa de Moraes, “I’m the Captain,” Bill Barr Tells Senators, Calling Robert Mueller Report “My Baby,” DEADLINE (May 1, 2019), https://deadline.com/2019/05/senators-grill-billbarr-robert-mueller-report-letter-democrats-1202605207/ [https://perma.cc/F4D6-J9EA]
(quoting Senator Kamala Harris’s statement that, “[t]his attorney general lacks all credibility
and has compromised the American public’s ability to believe he is a purveyor of justice”).
24. See, e.g., Jacob Heilbrunn, Donald Trump Is Dining Out on the Soul of William Barr,
SPECTATOR (May 1, 2019), https://spectator.us/donald-trump-soul-william-barr [https://
perma.cc/GN2K-2HAQ] (“Barr fought a battle with an invisible Robert Mueller for possession, claiming that his old pal’s letter to him complaining about ‘public confusion’ as a result of the rollout of the report was, in fact, ‘snitty.’ You’d probably be in a snit, too, if you
had labored for months to deliver the precious object, only to have it snatched away from
you by the duo of Barr and Donald Trump, manhandled and shielded, as far as possible,
from public view.”); Lauren Gambino, William Barr Defiant Amid Calls to Resign over His Handling of Mueller Report, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2019/may/01/william-barr-defiant-amid-calls-to-resign-over-his-handling-of-mueller-report
[https://perma.cc/76H4-ZP9M] (noting that several Democratic lawmakers urged Barr to
resign); see also Dana Milbank, Opinion, Barr Reminds Mueller: If You Want a Friend in Washington, Get a Dog, MAIL TRIB. (May 5, 2019), https://mailtribune.com/opinion/columns
/dana-milbank-barr-reminds-mueller-if-you-want-a-friend-in-washington-get-a-dog
[https:
//perma.cc/R5V6-SPMP] (“Barr rejected Mueller’s requests to release more of the report
to clear up the confusion . . . [i]t was his baby, and he smothered it—thus allowing Barr’s
misrepresentation of Mueller’s report (characterized by Trump as “total exoneration”) to
harden.”).
25.
Steven Shepard, Poll: Little Support for Barr’s Handling of Mueller Report, POLITICO
(May 8, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/08/poll-little-support-for-barrshandling-of-mueller-report-1309713 [https://perma.cc/K337-57AH].
26. Id.
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27

of the Report’s findings. Independents were evenly divided on
28
the question.
I concur with the sentiments expressed by many of Barr’s critics.
But irrespective of the merits of anyone’s beliefs regarding the
propriety of Barr’s actions, there are certain truths about prosecutorial conduct that are indisputable. Prosecutors are bound to perform their functions within certain ethical boundaries. They are
required to pursue justice in a manner that is fair in fact and in
29
appearance. American Bar Association guidelines instruct prosecutors “to seek justice within the bounds of the law” and not act
30
simply to obtain a conviction. Moreover, prosecutors must “act
with integrity and balanced judgment,” pursue and decline to pursue criminal charges when appropriate, and “avoid an appearance
31
of impropriety in performing the prosecution function.”
Barr’s handling of the Report was undeniably controversial and
raised serious questions regarding whether the actions of the DOJ
were consistent with these ethical dictates. But the propriety of
Barr’s conduct, which occurred at the conclusion of the Mueller
investigation, was merely the caboose at the end of a long train of
controversies that moved through the entirety of the investigation.
Ensnarled in dissonance from its inception, the Mueller investigation was beset by controversies that ultimately compromised its le32
gitimacy.
Virtually any high-profile criminal investigation will generate
controversies—some real and others feigned. And when a highprofile investigation involves a prominent political figure, the potential for political entanglements creates an added complication.
Such was the case during the Mueller investigation. In high-profile,
intensely polarized cases of this kind, there is no easy answer to this
problem. No “magic bullet” solution that exists. There are, however, ways in which difficulties and controversies can be substantially
reduced.
Historically, the objective of establishing an independent coun33
sel system has been to provide a “permanent statutory scheme for
appointing an officer, independent from the supervision and control of the President, to investigate and prosecute crimes by high-

27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b)–(c) (4th ed. 2017).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See infra Part II.
33. “Independent Counsel” is used here and throughout this Article interchangeably
with “Special Counsel” and “Special Prosecutor.”
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34

level federal officials.” A prosecutor truly independent of the executive branch can vitally strengthen—and in the current political
climate, perhaps restore—the public’s faith and confidence in the
35
government’s ability to investigate itself. But the absence of genuine independence can give rise to an appearance, if not the reality,
36
of impropriety that inevitably frays the public’s trust.
The Mueller probe exemplifies this problem. This Article will
explain why many of the controversies that beset the Mueller inves37
tigation can be sourced to the Special Counsel Regulations —the
rules that governed both Mueller’s appointment and the scope of
38
his investigative and prosecutorial authority. In addition, this Article will explain how many of these ills can be ameliorated by en39
acting a modified version of the Independent Counsel Statute.
Part I of this Article is foundational and will detail at length the
pertinent provisions of the Special Counsel Regulations and the
Independent Counsel Statute. It will be a study in contrasts—
Special Counsel Regulations that effectively hamstring prosecutorial independence, and an Independent Counsel Statute that had
struggled to restrain it.
Part II of this Article is analytical and will identify and discuss
four prominent matters that stirred controversy during the Mueller
investigation: Mueller’s appointment to the position of Special
Counsel, uncertainty about the President’s authority to remove
Mueller from this position, Mueller’s decision not to subpoena the
President, and debate over Mueller’s ability to indict a sitting president. During the course of this discussion, this Article will propose
that federal lawmakers put the expired Independent Counsel Statute back in place, albeit with significant modifications. Foremost
among the modifications is a requirement that Independent
40
Counsels adhere to the provisions of the Justice Manual prior to
34. Benjamin J. Priester, Paul G. Rozelle & Mirah A. Horowitz, The Independent Counsel
Statute: A Legal History, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (1999).
35. E.g., id.; see also Julian A. Cook, III, Mend It or End It? What to do with the Independent
Counsel Statute, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 280 (1998) (“[T]he independent counsel
statute was designed to remove politics from the prosecution of executive branch officials
and to foster public confidence in the prosecutorial process.”).
36. Cook, III, supra note 35, at 280 (noting the “conflict-of-interest problems inherent
in internal executive branch prosecutions”).
37. See General Powers of Special Counsel, 28 C.F.R. pt. 600 (2020). It is important to
note that the Special Counsel Regulations derive their authority from 5 U.S.C. § 301 and 28
U.S.C. §§ 509–10, 515–19. See also 28 U.S.C. § 543.
38. 28 C.F.R. § 600 (2019).
39. The 1978 Ethics in Government Act, the Ethics in Government Act Amendments of
1982, the Reauthorization Act of 1987, and the Reauthorization Act of 1994 are collectively
referred to here as the “Independent Counsel Statute.” See infra Part I for further discussion
regarding the historical development of these statutes.
40. See generally DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL (2018). At its core, the Justice Manual
addresses procedures federal prosecutors must comply with in an array of investigative and
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instigating certain investigative and prosecutorial actions. Also incorporated into the new statute would be a provision that permits
the Independent Counsel to seek judicial review of DOJ determinations with which the Independent Counsel disagrees. This refashioning of the Independent Counsel Statute will enhance investigative integrity by effectively granting the Special Counsel
sufficient autonomy to pursue investigative and prosecutorial strategies while constraining the exercise of undue discretion.
I. THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAWS AND SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR REGULATIONS
A. Independent Counsel Laws
As an outgrowth of the Watergate scandal, President Jimmy
41
Carter signed into law the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. The
Act was designed, in part, to address potential conflicts of interests
among executive branch officials, to ensure their accountability,
42
and to promote governmental integrity. Among the Act’s principal features were special prosecutor provisions that subjected a
43
multitude of executive branch officials to its jurisdiction.
To trigger a prosecution, the Attorney General would have to
receive specific information indicating that one of the Act’s covered officials had violated a federal criminal law (excluding petty
44
offenses). Upon receipt of such information, a preliminary inves45
tigation was initiated. If a determination was made that the allegation was unsubstantiated, then the Attorney General was required
46
47
to inform the Division of the Court of this conclusion. On the
prosecutorial situations. For an in-depth discussion of the Justice Manual, see infra notes
187–94 and accompanying text.
41. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599).
42. Id.; cf. Delaney Marsco, At 40 Years Old, the Ethics in Government Act Is in Need of a
Tune-up, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://campaignlegal.org/update/40years-old-ethics-government-act-need-tune [https://perma.cc/WV2X-MDVL]; Walter M.
Shaub, Jr., 35th Anniversary of the Ethics in Government Act, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS (Nov. 8,
2013), https://oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/Resources/35th+Anniversary+of+the+Ethics+in+
Government+Act [https://perma.cc/2CL3-2PZN]; Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PBS FRONTLINE (May 1998), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/shows/counsel/office/history.html [https://perma.cc/CTF7-VTUA]; Paul Francis
Laughlin, Ethics in Government Act, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 789 (1989).
43. These officials included the President, Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, Labor, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and Education.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1978).
45. Id.
46. The Act required that the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court appoint
three members from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to
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other hand, if further investigation or prosecution was warranted,
then the Attorney General was required to request that the Divi48
sion of the Court appoint a Special Prosecutor. The Division of
the Court would, in turn, define the Special Prosecutor’s investiga49
tive jurisdiction. The Attorney General could seek an expansion
of the original grant of jurisdiction for matters related to the initial
50
authorization.
The Special Prosecutor had access to all the traditional methods
of investigation available to DOJ prosecutors (e.g., grand jury, civil
and criminal trials, appeals, or immunity grants) and could access
51
DOJ resources (e.g., pertinent records, files, personnel). Compliance with DOJ policies was also expected, though the statute’s language granted the Special Prosecutor discretion to disregard such
52
policies in certain circumstances.
The submission of a final report to the Division of the Court was
also expected prior to the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s ac53
tivities. It was required that the report describe the work of the
Special Counsel, including the status of investigations pursued as
54
well as reasons underlying decisions not to prosecute. The Division of the Court was also vested with discretion regarding the pub55
lic release of the report. If the Special Prosecutor received “substantial and credible information” that may form the basis for
impeachment, however, he was required to share this information
56
with the House of Representatives.
Removal of the Special Counsel was limited to “extraordinary
impropriety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other
condition that substantially impair[ed] the performance of such
57
special prosecutor’s duties.” A Special Prosecutor could then
serve as members of the Division of the Court. Each member served a two-year term, and the
panel was responsible for selecting a Special Prosecutor and defining his or her jurisdiction.
Id. §§ 49, 591–598.
47. Id. § 592(b)(1).
48. Id. § 592(c)(1). In addition, a majority of the Democratic or Republican members
of the Judiciary Committees in the House of Representative or in the Senate could also request that the attorney general seek the appointment of a Special Prosecutor. See Id. §
595(e).
49. Id. § 592(d)(1).
50. Id. § 593(c).
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 594(a) & 594(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
52. Id. § 594(f).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(1) (1978).
54. Id. § 595(b)(2).
55. Id. § 595(b)(3).
56. Id. § 595(c).
57. Id. § 596(a)(1). The Supreme Court specifically addressed this removal standard in
the Act’s later version, the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, and upheld it as constitutional in its 1988 Morrison decision. The Court explained that this limitation on the Attorney General’s removal power did not “sufficiently deprive[] the President of control over
the independent counsel [as] to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obligation”
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promptly seek review of her removal by filing a civil action before
58
the Division of the Court.
Conclusion of a Special Counsel’s operation could come by virtue of a notification by the Special Prosecutor to the Attorney
General that the office’s work had been completed or substantially
59
completed. Termination could also be instigated by the Division
of the Court, pursuant to its own initiative or by virtue of a request
60
by the Attorney General.
Congress reauthorized the Special Prosecutor Statute in 1982,
1987, and 1994. Notably—if only for symbolic value—in 1982, the
term “independent counsel” supplanted “special counsel”
61
throughout the Statute. And in 1987, the Statute was renamed the
62
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act. It lapsed in 1992 but
was reinstated in 1994 as the Independent Counsel Reauthoriza63
tion Act of 1994.
64
The 1994 statute was reauthorized only until 1999. It differed
from the original Act in several notable respects. One such difference concerned the scope of individuals subject to independent
counsel investigation. In contrast to the 1978 statute, the 1994 ver65
sion extended coverage to members of Congress. Additionally,
coverage was expanded to situations in which a political, personal,
66
or financial conflict prevented a proper investigation by the DOJ.
Congress also instituted several changes regarding the Attorney
General’s investigative parameters. The 1978 statute required a
preliminary investigation upon receipt by the Attorney General of
specific information of a violation of federal law and a referral to
the Division of the Court unless the information was unsubstantiated. In contrast, the 1994 statute limited the criterion upon which
the Attorney General could determine whether a referral should
be made, namely, 1) whether specific information was received,
and that the act as a whole did not violate separation of powers principles “by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive Branch.” Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)
(emphasizing that Congress did not retain any control in the appointment nor removal of
the independent counsel and thus did not increase its own power at the expense of the executive branch).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (1978).
59. Id. § 596(b)(1)(A).
60. Id. § 596(b)(2).
61. See Mokhiber, supra note 42.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1987).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 591(c)(2) (providing that the Attorney General, if it was deemed in the public
interest, could conduct a preliminary investigation if “information sufficient to constitute
grounds to investigate a Member of Congress” regarding a violation of Federal criminal law
(other than certain misdemeanors or infractions) was received.)
66. Id. § 591(c)(1) (allowing for a preliminary investigation in such circumstances
when sufficient information is received by the Attorney General suggesting a violation of
Federal criminal laws (other than certain misdemeanors and infractions)).
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67

and 2) the credibility of the source. The Attorney General had 90
68
days to complete the investigation.
As in the original Act, the Independent Counsel Statute empowered the Division of the Court to establish the prosecutor’s investi69
gative jurisdiction. The court could also expand this jurisdictional
70
grant upon request of the Attorney General. The Independent
Counsel was additionally required to submit annual reports to
71
Congress discussing the status of investigations, as well as a final
72
report when her work was completed.
The Attorney General was authorized to seek removal of an Independent Counsel for “good cause, physical or mental disability . . . or any other condition that substantially impairs the per73
formance of such Independent Counsel’s duties.” If removed, the
Attorney General was required to submit a report to the Division of
74
the Court. An Independent Counsel could then challenge a removal action in the United States District Court for the District of
75
Columbia.
The Independent Counsel was required to follow DOJ policies,
“except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the

67. Id. § 591(d)(1) (stating that the Attorney General could consider “only” these two
criterions).
68. Id. § 592(a)(1). However, a 60-day extension could be granted by the Division of
the Court. Id. § 592(a)(3) (“The Attorney General may apply to the division of the court for
a single extension, for a period of not more than 60 days, of the 90-day period referred to in
paragraph (1). The division of the court may, upon a showing of good cause, grant such
extension.”).
69. Id. § 593 (b)(3) (“[T]he division of the court shall assure that the independent
counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter with
respect to which the Attorney General has requested the appointment of the independent
counsel, and all matters related to that subject matter.”). The jurisdictional grant included
matters that “may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of the matter with respect to
which the Attorney General’s request was made, including perjury, obstruction of justice,
destruction of evidence and intimidation of witnesses.” Id.
70. Id. § 593(c)(1). If the Attorney General received an expansion request from the
Independent Counsel, the Attorney General was required to perform a preliminary investigation and “give great weight to any recommendations of the independent counsel.” Id.
§ 593(c)(2)(A).
71. Id. § 595(a)(2).
72. Id. § 594 (h)(1)(B) (requiring that the final report provide a complete description
of the counsel’s work and detail the disposition of the cases litigated).
73. Id. § 596(a)(1) (providing that the authority to remove was vested “only” with the
Attorney General).
74. Id. § 596(a)(2). The Attorney General was also required to submit a report to the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Id. (“The committees shall make available to the
public such report, except that each committee may, if necessary to protect the rights of any
individual named in the report or to prevent undue interference with any pending prosecution, postpone or refrain from publishing any or all of the report. The division of the court
may release any or all of such report in accordance with section 594(h)(2).”).
75. Id. § 596(a)(3) (providing that no member of the division of the court could “hear
or determine any such civil action” or appeal, and that the district court could order an independent counsel’s reinstatement).
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purposes of this chapter.” This was a slight modification from the
1978 language that required “[compliance] to the extent that such
77
special prosecutor deem[ed] appropriate.”
B. Special Counsel Regulations
To the surprise of few, the Independent Counsel Statute finally
lapsed in 1999. Independent counsel investigations into the
Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush, and William (Bill) Clinton administrations, as well as concerns regarding costs, investigation duration, and inadequate constraints on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, left many in Congress with “a profound sense of fa78
tigue.”
In its place, the Special Counsel Regulations—still in effect today—were promulgated, and require the Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor in instances where the DOJ has a conflict of interest or where it is in the public interest to make such an
79
appointment. The regulations empower the Attorney General to
appoint a Special Counsel or perform an investigation “[w]hen
matters are brought to the attention of the Attorney General that
might warrant consideration of appointment of a Special Coun80
sel.” The Special Counsel selected must not be employed by the
81
federal government, and his investigative jurisdiction is deter82
mined solely by the Attorney General. The jurisdictional grant in76. Id. § 594(f)(1).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1978).
78. Helen Dewar, Independent Counsel Law Is Set to Lapse, WASH. POST, June 5, 1999, at
A2.
79. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1(a)–(b) (2019) (allowing also for the appointment of a Special
Counsel by the Acting Attorney General in instances where the Attorney General has been
recused).
80. Id. § 600.2(a)–(b). This section details the alternatives available to an Attorney
General when pertinent information is received. It lists three options: 1) “[a]ppoint a Special Counsel;” 2) “[d]irect that an initial investigation, consisting of such factual inquiry or
legal research as the Attorney General deems appropriate, be conducted in order to better
inform the decision; and 3) “[c]onclude that under the circumstances of the matter, the
public interest would not be served by removing the investigation from the normal processes
of the Department, and that the appropriate component of the Department should handle
the matter. If the Attorney General reaches this conclusion, he or she may direct that appropriate steps be taken to mitigate any conflicts of interest, such as recusal of particular
officials.” Id.
81. Id. § 600.3(a) (also requiring that the “Special Counsel . . . be a lawyer with a reputation for integrity and impartial decisionmaking, and with appropriate experience to ensure both that the investigation will be conducted ably, expeditiously and thoroughly, and
that investigative and prosecutorial decisions will be supported by an informed understanding of the criminal law and Department of Justice policies”). In addition, the Special Counsel’s responsibilities “shall take first precedence in their professional lives, and that it may be
necessary to devote their full time to the investigation, depending on its complexity and the
stage of the investigation.” Id.
82. Id. § 600.4(b).
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cludes authority to investigate crimes committed during the course
of, and with intent to interfere with, the investigation, such as per83
jury, witness intimidation, and obstruction of justice. The Special
Counsel can request that his jurisdictional authority be expanded,
84
but the decision rests exclusively with the Attorney General.
The regulations effectively equate the Special Counsel with a
85
United States Attorney, and require compliance with all DOJ
86
practices, policies, rules, and regulations. In the event of a circumstance requiring an “extraordinary” decision, the Special
Counsel may consult with the Attorney General. 87 Further, the Attorney General can seek explanations from the Special Counsel regarding certain investigative practices and may conclude that such
88
actions are inappropriate and should not be undertaken. The
regulations require, however, that the Attorney General give “great
89
weight” to the perspective of the special prosecutor.
The Attorney General is also permitted to remove the Special
90
Counsel. The regulations provide that removal is authorized “for
misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or
for other good cause, including violation of Departmental poli91
cies.” If the Special Counsel is removed, the Attorney General is
merely required to notify—and need not submit a report to—the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Judiciary Commit92
tee in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
83. Id. § 600.4(a) (noting that the Special Counsel is to be provided with a “specific
factual statement” describing the matter to be investigated, and that the Special Counsel can
also pursue appeals of adverse judicial determinations encountered during the investigation
and/or prosecution).
84. Id. § 600.4(b).
85. See id. § 600.6 (“[T]he Special Counsel shall exercise . . . the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United
States Attorney. Except as provided in this part, the Special Counsel shall determine whether and to what extent to inform or consult with the Attorney General or others within the
Department about the conduct of his or her duties and responsibilities.”).
86. Id. § 600.7(a) (requiring Special Counsel consultation with appropriate Department divisions for guidance in regards to “established practices, policies and procedures,” as
well as ethical and security matters).
87. Id. (detailing the process that a Special Counsel should follow when seeking to
evade compliance with Department policies and practices).
88. Id. § 600.7(b) (“The Special Counsel shall not be subject to the day-to-day supervision of any official of the Department. However, the Attorney General may request that the
Special Counsel provide an explanation for any investigative or prosecutorial step, and may
after review conclude that the action is so inappropriate or unwarranted under established
Departmental practices that it should not be pursued.”).
89. Id. Note, however, that this regulatory requirement is relatively vague.
90. Id. § 600.7(d) (stating that removal authority is vested exclusively with the Attorney
General and that in the event a Special Counsel is removed a written explanation must be
provided detailing the reason underlying the decision).
91. Id. While this is similar to the standards in the Independent Counsel Statute, the
review process is eliminated in the Special Counsel Regulations.
92. Id. § 600.9(a). Such notification must also be provided when a Special Counsel is
appointed and when the investigation performed by the Special Counsel is concluded. Id.
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Upon the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he must
prepare a confidential report, to be submitted to the Attorney
General, that details “the prosecution or declination decisions
93
reached by the Special Counsel.” It is within the discretion of the
94
Attorney General whether to release the report to the public.
In the end, several notable differences exist between the Special
Counsel Regulations and the Independent Counsel Statute.
Whereas the Independent Counsel Statute placed meaningful limitations upon the Attorney General, the Special Counsel Regulations did not. The most significant differences pertain to the extent of attorney general oversight, which is plainly more extensive
95
under the Special Counsel Regulations.
II. MUELLER INVESTIGATION CONTROVERSIES AND
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
This Part argues that adopting a modified version of the expired
Independent Counsel Statute will effectively address the inherent
problems associated with internal executive branch criminal investigations and prosecutions. In making this argument, I examine
various legal subjects and controversies associated with the Mueller
investigation: the appointment and removal processes, the authority to indict a sitting president, and the power to issue a grand jury
subpoena ad testificandum. I then explain why certain provisions in
the 1994 Independent Counsel Act effectively address some of
these controversies. Others, however, can only be addressed sufficiently through statutory modification. As to this latter claim, I
propose an innovative reform that effectively mandates independent counsel adherence with DOJ policies, yet enables investigations
of alleged executive branch corruption to proceed largely independent of undue executive branch influence. A blend of prosecutorial independence and constraint can restore much of the public
confidence lost in the current structure.

93. Id. § 600.8(c).
94. Id. § 600.9(c) (noting that the Attorney General’s decision whether to release the
report should be guided by whether such release would be in the public interest). This is
another departure from the Independent Counsel Statute, where the Division of the Court
(and in some circumstances, Congress) had discretion regarding the public release of the
independent counsel’s report. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
95. JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43112, INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 3–4 (2013).
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A. Relevant Factual and Legal Landscapes
Controversies plagued the Mueller investigation since its inception. Shortly after Mueller’s appointment as Special Counsel on
May 17, 2017, President Trump complained that Mueller was bi96
ased, citing several purported conflicts. Trump referenced
Mueller’s friendship with former Federal Bureau of Investigation
97
(FBI) Director James Comey, Mueller’s alleged interest in serving
98
as FBI director during the Trump Administration, Mueller’s
membership in a law firm associated with Trump affiliates, and an
alleged dispute between Mueller and a Trump-owned golf club
99
over membership fees. As the investigation progressed, speculation mounted regarding Mueller’s possible removal from his position as Special Counsel—specifically, there were persistent rumors
100
that President Trump might fire Mueller. Accompanying these
rumors was considerable concern, including among some Republicans, that protective congressional legislation was becoming im101
perative.

96. See Hope Yen & Eric Tucker, AP Fact Check: Trump Falsely Says Mueller Appointment
Biased, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://apnews.com/87c52ad4f7a84eb59c1d587
befcc1ae2 [https://perma.cc/Q8GD-YM92].
97. See id.; Kyle Cheney, GOP Congressman to Trump: Mueller Probe ‘Infected with Bias,’
POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/12/matt-gaetz-trumpmueller-russia-investigation-292731 [https://perma.cc/V7LM-J42X] (illustrating later claims
by Republican congressmen that the Mueller investigation was “infected with bias”); cf. Brett
Samuels, Gohmert Presses Mueller on Comey Friendship, Handling of FBI Agents, THE HILL (July
24, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/454488-gohmert-presses-mueller-on-come
y-friendship-handling-of-fbi-agents [https://perma.cc/NG9V-PSZL]. These later articles
represent a shift in the attitudes of conservative politicians toward Mueller’s perceived bias
against Trump—indeed, several Republicans had initially supported the choice to name
Mueller as Special Counsel, viewing him as credible. See Austin Wright, Republicans Jump on
Special Prosecutor Bandwagon, POLITICO (May 17, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story
/2017/05/17/special-prosecutor-republicans-mueller-238527 [https://perma.cc/Q7QNW35G].
98. Eric Tucker, Michael Balsamo & Chad Day, Trump: Robert Mueller Is a “Never Trumper,” Who Led a Biased Probe, DENVER POST (May 30, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019
/05/30/trump-robert-mueller-probe/ [https://perma.cc/A626-SS3W].
99.
Robert Farley & Eugene Kiely, Debunking Mueller’s ‘Conflicts’, FACTCHECK.ORG (Apr.
19, 2010), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/04/debunking-muellers-conflicts/ [https://
perma.cc/9GW9-Q6C8].
100. See Caitlin Oprysko, Trump Disputes McGahn Testimony on Attempts to Fire Mueller,
POLITICO (June 14, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/14/trump-mcgahn-test
imony-mueller-1364873 [https://perma.cc/7NM4-LSLQ] (noting White House counsel
Don McGahn’s testimony that Trump wanted him to fire Mueller); Michael S. Schmidt &
Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off when White House Counsel
Threatened to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us
/politics/trump-mueller-special-counsel-russia.html [https://perma.cc/YB3P-S5AZ] (noting
that Trump “wavered for months” on the question of whether to fire Mueller).
101. See, e.g., Rebecca Shabad, Trump Would Be Barred from Firing Mueller Under Bipartisan
Bill, NBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018) https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/bipartisangroup-senators-merge-bills-protect-mueller-n864926 [https://perma.cc/PBG2-PPQJ]; see also
Michael D. Shear & Eileen Sullivan, Senate Democrats Seek to Protect Mueller from Being Fired,
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In addition, there was significant and vociferous public debate
regarding Mueller’s authority to indict a sitting president and to
102
issue him a grand jury subpoena ad testificandum. Regarding the
indictment question, the law is not settled. Views expressed in government memorandums and by academic scholars have varied
103
throughout history and continue to differ. Trump and his legal
team, however, steadfastly maintained that Mueller as Special
104
Counsel retained no such authority, while some prominent
105
Democrats insisted otherwise. Indeed, even Kenneth Starr, the
former Independent Counsel who investigated Bill Clinton in the
106
1990s, suggested that it is possible to indict Trump. Starr conceded, however, that doing so would be contrary to established
DOJ policy, that it is thus unlikely to occur, and that he disagrees
107
with the policy. In the end, Mueller declined to indict President
Trump. In his final report, Mueller, despite citing ten instances
where the President arguably obstructed justice, relied on a DOJ
Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that concluded that a sit108
ting president could not be indicted.

N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/politics/trumpmueller-fired-special-counsel.html [https://perma.cc/3MBD-3FRP].
102. In other words, a subpoena commanding oral testimony as opposed to document
production (i.e., subpoena duces tecum).
103. E.g., Garrett Epps, The Only Way to Find Out if the President Can Be Indicted, THE
ATLANTIC
(May
23,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05
/presidential-indictment/560957/ [https://perma.cc/XR3U-LG9S]; see also Mark Medish,
President Donald Trump Can Be Indicted—And Here’s the Constitutional Proof, NBC NEWS (Mar.
21,
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/president-donald-trump-can-beindicted-here-s-constitutional-proof-ncna985586 [https://perma.cc/V5WW-ED9X]; Salvador
Rizzo, Can the President Be Indicted or Subpoenaed?, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/05/22/can-the-presidentbe-indicted-or-subpoenaed [https://perma.cc/8YQD-2LRP].
104. See Sean Illing, Trump’s Lawyer Says He Can’t Be Prosecuted. I Asked 16 Legal Experts if
That’s True, VOX (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/29/18644304/trump-fifthavenue-mazars-vance-constitution.
105. E.g., Susan Davis, Ari Shapiro & Jessica Taylor, Pelosi Says Congress Should Pass New
Laws so Sitting Presidents Can Be Indicted, NPR (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019
/09/20/762594886/pelosi-says-congress-should-pass-new-laws-so-sitting-presidents-can-beindicted [https://perma.cc/9KRC-CGRR] (noting Representative Nancy Pelosi’s claim that
sitting presidents are subject to indictment); see also Tara Golshan, Elizabeth Warren Says She
Wants to Make It Legal to Indict Presidents, VOX (May 31, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5
/31/18647042/elizabeth-warren-trump-indictment-mueller (describing Senator Elizabeth
Warren’s campaign pledge to change DOJ policy regarding presidential indictments).
106. Starr: Yes, a Sitting President Could Be Indicted (CNN television broadcast Mar. 8,
2019).
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Ramsey Touchberry, OLC Opinion Explained: Why Robert Mueller Couldn’t Indict Trump, Despite 10 Obstruction Incidents, NEWSWEEK (July 24, 2019), https://www.news
week.com/olc-opinion-mueller-doj-memo-indict-trump-sitting-president-1450896 [https://
perma.cc/D56A-SA9V].
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109

Also unsettled is the grand jury subpoena issue. Again, Trump
and the Democrats had contrasting viewpoints. Trump unsurpris110
ingly insisted that he was not subject to subpoena as President,
while Democrats maintained that he was. Mueller ultimately did
not issue a subpoena for Trump, but instead agreed to allow the
111
President to answer written questions. Mueller later testified before the House Judiciary Committee that the reasons underlying
his decision not to subpoena Trump were to avoid protracted liti112
gation and to expedite the conclusion of the investigation.
These controversies, without more, are powerful indicia of the
need to reform the process of investigating alleged executive
branch corruption. The widespread allegations of bias from both
political parties, the uncertainty regarding Mueller’s tenure, the
unsettled questions of law, and the omnipresent oversight of the
DOJ, among other concerns, fed a persistent and unhealthy perception regarding the integrity of the Mueller investigation. Remarkably, in the months following the conclusion of the Mueller
investigation, concerns regarding the executive branch’s ability to
criminally investigate itself became even more pronounced.
In February of 2020, President Trump declared himself the nation’s chief law enforcement officer and insisted that he had the
113
right to intervene in federal criminal prosecutions. That same
month, the President expressed his view, via Twitter, that a sentencing memorandum recommendation submitted by DOJ prosecutors in a federal case involving Roger Stone—a case initiated by
114
Robert Mueller—was too harsh. Trump also attacked the federal

109. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Opinion, Trump Can’t Be Indicted. Can He Be Subpoenaed?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/opinion/trump-lawyers-indic
ted-subpoena.html [https://perma.cc/XH83-UTBC].
110. E.g., Jon Greenberg & Louis Jacobson, Can Robert Mueller Subpoena Donald Trump? A
Look at the Legal Precedents, POLITIFACT (May 9, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/article/20
18/may/09/can-robert-mueller-subpoena-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/XR3B-3GAF].
111. See Alan Neuhauser, Mueller Explains Why He Didn’t Subpoena Trump, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (July 24, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/201907-24/robert-mueller-explains-why-he-didnt-subpoena-donald-trump.
112. See id.
113. See Edward Helmore, Trump Claims He Has ‘Legal Right’ to Intervene in Criminal Cases,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/14/trumpclaims-legal-right-intervene-criminal-cases-william-barr-plea-not-tweet
[https://perma.cc
/9XVK-C6JX] (“The move prompted a crisis of credibility for the US justice system, as top
lawyers warned it could undermine the integrity of federal prosecutors . . . and ultimately
threaten democracy itself.”); Noah Bierman & Del Quentin Wilber, Trump Claims ‘Legal
Right’ to Intervene in Justice Department Cases, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-02-14/trump-claims-legal-right-to-intervenein-justice-department-cases; Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, How Trump’s Relationship with
Barr Got So Complicated, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14
/us/politics/trump-william-barr.html [https://perma.cc/74EW-NY6F].
114. See sources cited supra note 113.
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115

judge presiding over the Stone case, questioned the impartiality
116
of the jury foreperson, and eventually commuted Stone’s sen117
tence. Attorney General Barr responded in a televised interview
that the President’s frequent public statements regarding DOJ
118
criminal matters made “it impossible for [him] to do [his] job.”
In addition, the Federal Judges Association, which describes itself
as a “national voluntary organization of United States federal judges . . . whose mission is to support and enhance the role of
119
its members within a fair, impartial and independent judiciary,”
held an emergency meeting presumably to discuss matters related
120
to the President’s extraordinary public commentaries.
Irrespective of the merits of these various claims and counterclaims, what is inescapable is that the appearance of investigative
impartiality regarding alleged executive branch wrongdoing has
been severely compromised. At no time since Watergate has there
been such a clear need for reform. Admittedly, no set of proposals
could ever effectively preempt all cries of foul during federal criminal investigations, especially in high-profile cases involving political figures. Yet, in this context, substantive reforms could be enacted that would meaningfully pacify concerns regarding investigative
impropriety and thereby ultimately enhance the public trust.

115. See Justin Wise, Judges’ Association Calls Emergency Meeting in Wake of Stone Sentencing
Reversal, THE HILL (Feb. 17, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/48339
8-judges-association-calls-emergency-meeting-in-wake-of-roger-stone [https://perma.cc/X9E
7-5LW9].
116. Edward Helmore, Trump Complains of Roger Stone Trial ‘Bias’ After Head Juror Speaks
Out, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/13
/trump-roger-stone-trial-jury [https://perma.cc/526V-CKTE].
117. Peter Baker, Maggie Haberman & Sharon LaFraniere, Trump Commutes Sentence of
Roger Stone in Case He Long Denounced, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/07/10/us/politics/trump-roger-stone-clemency.html [https://perma.cc/WG496MU9].
118. Anne Flaherty, Barr Blasts Trump’s Tweets on Stone Case: ‘Impossible for Me to Do My Job,’
ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/barr-blasts-trumps-tweetsstone-case-impossible-job/story?id=68963276 [https://perma.cc/52HZ-CEPH]. In excess of
1,100 former federal prosecutors signed a letter urging Barr to resign. See Jacob Knutson,
Over 1,100 Former DOJ Officials Call for Barr’s Resignation, AXIOS (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.
axios.com/justice-department-statement-barr-stone-case-14c8880c-6f07-460f-a190-6f2a2f7e
78e8.html [https://perma.cc/6K7Q-ADQ4]; Katie Benner, Former Justice Dept. Lawyers Press
for Barr to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/16
/us/politics/barr-trump-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/T3P5-ECEM]; DOJ
Alumni Statement on the Events Surrounding the Sentencing of Roger Stone, MEDIUM (Feb. 16,
2020), https://medium.com/@dojalumni/doj-alumni-statement-on-the-events-surroundingthe-sentencing-of-roger-stone-c2cb75ae4937 [https://perma.cc/LH9L-TLLP].
119. Who We Are, FED. JUDGES ASS’N, https://www.federaljudgesassoc.org/section/index.
php?structureid=17 [https://perma.cc/8VWU-AYXC] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
120. Wise, supra note 115.
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B. Special Counsel Appointment and Removal
Initially, Mueller’s appointment as Special Counsel was met with
121
strong bipartisan support. But Trump was critical from the out122
set, claiming that Mueller was conflicted. In time, however, the
perception among congressional Republicans of Mueller as an impartial investigator began to wane as allegations of bias became in123
creasingly common. Indeed, by the time of Mueller’s testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee on July 24, 2019, there was
little daylight between Trump and congressional Republicans regarding the integrity (or lack thereof) of the Mueller investiga124
tion.
As the investigation progressed, rumors were steadfast that
125
Trump wanted to remove Mueller from his position. The threats
were visible and fears palpable that Trump’s impulsivity might lead
121. See Wright, supra note 97; Josh Gerstein, Matthew Nussbaum, Darren Samuelsohn &
Josh Dawsey, Justice Dept. Names Mueller Special Counsel for Russia Probe, POLITICO
(May 17, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/17/justice-dept-to-appoint-speci
al-prosecutor-for-russia-probe-238524 (“The move also met bipartisan approval—or at least
acceptance—on Capitol Hill, where even Republicans who had resisted the call for a special
prosecutor lauded Mueller.”); Jordain Carney, Special Counsel Appointment Gets Bipartisan
Praise, THE Hill (May 17, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/333963lawmakers-cheer-decision-to-name-special-prosecutor-for-russia [https://perma.cc/4U7XZLNT] (noting that Senator Burr (R-NC) referred to the appointment as “a positive move”;
Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) stated that Mueller was an “excellent choice”; Senator Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA) described the appointment as “a good first step”; and Senator Chris Coons
(D-DE) stated that Mueller was “a very strong choice”).
122. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Manu Raju & Jeremy Herb, Republicans Ratchet Up Mueller Criticism, CNN
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/13/politics/bob-mueller-criticism
/index.html [https://perma.cc/H7BV-HGT6] (“Republicans in Congress are sharpening
their criticism of Robert Mueller and his team of prosecutors, a sign that the special counsel
investigating the President Donald Trump’s campaign is increasingly losing GOP support on
Capitol Hill.”); Cheney, supra note 97 (illustrating later claims by Republican congressmen
that the Mueller investigation was “infected with bias”); cf. Samuels, supra note 97.
124. See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Ahead of House Hearing, Republicans Sharpen Knives for
Mueller, REUTERS (July 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-muellerconservatives/ahead-of-house-hearing-republicans-sharpen-knives-for-mueller-idUSKCN1UI
2O9 [https://perma.cc/E3E3-XY8W] (“Robert Mueller stayed mum for nearly two years in
the face of repeated verbal attacks on his integrity by President Donald Trump and his conservative Republican allies in Congress.”).
125. See sources cited supra note 100. There were also reports that Rod Rosenstein, the
Deputy Attorney General who oversaw the Mueller investigation, would be fired by Trump.
See Jerry Dunleavy, Scapegoat: Democrats Turn on ‘Partisan’ William Barr Who Was ‘Handpicked’ by
Trump, WASH. EXAM’R (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news
/scapegoat-democrats-turn-on-partisan-william-barr-who-was-handpicked-by-trump. Trump
had earlier generated considerable controversy when on May 9, 2017, he fired FBI Director
James Comey. See Philip Bump, Timeline: What We Know About Trump’s Decision to Fire Comey,
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/01
/05/timeline-what-we-know-about-trumps-decision-to-fire-comey/ [https://perma.cc/62YBK6NP] (detailing the timeline that ultimately led to Comey’s firing); Eric Tucker, The Comey
Firing, as Retold by the Mueller Report, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://apnews.com
/4ff1ecb621884a728b25e62661257ef0 [https://perma.cc/T4KT-QZEE] (noting that
Comey’s firing caused “chaos” within the administration).
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to another “Saturday Night Massacre.” To some, Trump had previously demonstrated his propensity for such behavior when on
127
May 9, 2017, he fired former FBI Director James Comey. And
there were leaked reports—later affirmed in detail in Mueller’s final report—that Trump had ordered White House Counsel Don
128
McGahn to have Mueller fired. In response to this concern, bipartisan members of Congress introduced various House and Sen129
ate bills designed to safeguard Mueller from removal. None of
130
the bills, however, were voted on.
Public trust was the primary rationale underlying Mueller’s ap131
pointment. The appointment came on the heels of the Comey
firing, Trump’s subsequent admission during a television interview
with Lester Holt of NBC News that the Russia investigation was a
factor in that decision, and Democratic demands that a Special
126. David A. Graham, The Saturday Night Massacre That Wasn’t, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-saturday-night-massacre
-that-wasnt/551543/ [https://perma.cc/3FF4-3NE9] (“For months after Special Counsel
Robert Mueller was appointed, President Trump openly flirted with firing him . . . .”).
127. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 125; see also Ron Elving, FBI Director James Comey’s Firing
Resembles the Saturday Night Massacre, NPR (May 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/
05/09/527674347/fbi-director-james-comeys-firing-resembles-the-saturday-night-massacre
[https://perma.cc/5S2K-RKHU] (noting the comparison of Comey’s firing to the infamous
Saturday Night Massacre); cf. Catherine Lucey, Comey Firing Compared to Nixon’s ‘Saturday
Night Massacre,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 10, 2017), https://apnews.com/d670df686d8d43c9
a54d743f7127d6d7 [https://perma.cc/X4U8-U4DA]. Notably, Douglas Brinkley, a presidential historian at Rice University, called the comparison “apt.” Id.
128. See Schmidt & Haberman, supra note 100 (describing Trump’s efforts to direct
McGahn to have Mueller fired and McGahn’s subsequent threat to resign); Editorial, What
the Mueller Report Says About Trump’s Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-trump-allegedly-ordered-mcgahn-to-remove-mue
ller-11556202296 [https://perma.cc/37JY-ENZY] (noting McGahn’s claim that Trump twice
instructed him to have Mueller fired).
129. See, e.g., H.R. 3654, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1735, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1741, 115th
Cong. (2017) (proposing various statutory protections for Special Counsels, particularly with
respect to removal in light of Trump’s threats to fire Mueller); see also S. 71, 116th Cong.
(2019); H.R. 197, 116th Cong. (2019) (outlining more recent proposals for judicial review
of special counsel investigations and removal procedures).
130. E.g., Marianne Levine, Senate GOP Blocks Mueller Protection Bill for Third Time,
POLITICO
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/19/senaterepublicans-block-for-a-third-time-mueller-protection-bill-1070781 [https://perma.cc
/3EGG-KERM]; Lauren Gambino, McConnell Says He Will Not Allow Vote on Bill Protecting
Mueller from Firing, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2018/apr/17/mitch-mcconnell-robert-mueller-donald-trump-firing-bill [https://perma.cc
/EP6U-3UQM]; Eliza Collins & Bart Jansen, Senate Again Blocks Senate Bill that Would Protect
Special Counsel Robert Mueller, USA TODAY (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/politics/2018/11/28/mueller-probe-senate-again-rejects-vote-protect-special-counsel
/2136466002/ [https://perma.cc/6MZB-7H8G]; see also CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., WSLG1861, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS SEEK STATUTORY PROTECTIONS RELATED TO
REMOVING A SPECIAL COUNSEL (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/legprop.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/TQF4-4WFS].
131. Devlin Barrett, Sari Horwitz & Matt Zapotosky, Deputy Attorney General Appoints Special Counsel to Oversee Probe of Russian Interference in Election, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/deputy-attorney-general-appointsspecial-counsel-to-oversee-probe-of-russian-interference-in-election/2017/05/17/302c17743b49-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html [https://perma.cc/2LYG-CARA].
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132

Counsel be appointed. Rod Rosenstein, who was the acting Attorney General at the time of the appointment, stated that “based
upon the unique circumstances the public interest requires me to
place this investigation under the authority of a person who exercises a degree of independence from the normal chain of com133
mand.”
As noted, Mueller’s appointment was initially met with bipartisan praise before perception of the Special Counsel splintered
134
along party lines. But, irrespective of the merits of his selection,
and the team ultimately assembled, Mueller’s tenure was destined
to be hampered by controversy and public doubt regarding its legitimacy. Certainly, such outcomes were partly attributable to the
nature of the investigation. Fairness questions and vociferous complaints will inevitably accompany any criminal investigation involving a high-profile executive branch official, particularly a presi135
dent. But these legitimacy questions can also be traced to the
Special Counsel Regulations themselves—regulations that vest the
Attorney General with overarching influence over the selection
and removal of special counsels, as well as the investigations they
may pursue.
Regarding appointments, the Attorney General’s discretion is
largely unencumbered, hindered only by the requirement that the
counsel selected not be employed by the government. The Attor136
ney General enjoys similar latitude with respect to removal.
While the regulations identify specific instances where removal is
authorized (e.g., misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, deviation from departmental policies), it also contains a removal provision (“other good cause”) that is bereft of de137
fined limitations. That the regulations are devoid of language
suggesting the Attorney General’s decisions regarding appointment and removal are reviewable complicates matters even fur132. See Jessica Taylor & Carrie Johnson, Former FBI Director Mueller Appointed as Special
Counsel to Oversee Russia Probe, NPR (May 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/17
/528846598/former-fbi-director-mueller-appointed-special-counsel-to-oversee-russia-probe
[https://perma.cc/Q9QW-KV3B].
133. Barrett et al., supra note 131.
134. Taylor & Johnson, supra note 132 (citing various Democratic and Republican leaders who praised Mueller’s selection); see also supra notes 101, 124 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion about high-profile criminal justice matters and scrutiny from outside sources, see ANTHONY W. BATTS, MADDY DELONE & DARREL W. STEPHENS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., POLICING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 1 (2014),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/246328.pdf, which discusses the “notorious case of the
Central Park Five” and comments that “[f]ew events subject the criminal justice system to as
intense scrutiny from policymakers, elected officials, the media and the general public as
the exoneration of a wrongfully convicted defendant.” And adding that “this and other highprofile wrongful convictions continue to spark controversy.” Id.
136. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) (2019).
137. Id.
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ther. Thus, the “degree of independence” Rosenstein envisioned
with the Mueller appointment was simply divorced from the reality
of the Special Counsel Regulations.
The appointment and removal provisions contained in the Independent Counsel Statute effectively mitigate the intrinsic problems associated with executive branch appointment and removal
decisions. When the executive branch investigates alleged criminal
wrongdoing within its ranks, there are unavoidable and inherent
conflicts. The conflicts are perceptive, they are real, and they erode
the public trust. The Supreme Court elaborated on these conflicts
139
in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. There, the Court
stated that “[p]rosecution by someone with conflicting loyalties
‘calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a
140
defendant to judgment.’ ” Further, the Court added that “an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general,” that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” and that
a conflicted prosecutor “presents the appearance of precisely the
141
opposite.” The Court further commented that such appointments produce “pervasive” errors and “call[] into question, and
therefore require[] scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire prosecu142
tion, rather than simply a discrete prosecutorial decision.”
These inherent conflicts, and the resulting public distrust, are
credited with the birth of the Independent Counsel Statute. Professor Julie O’Sullivan explains that the Statute was the outgrowth
of
public opinion polls and the elections of 1974 and 1976
[indicating] that some action should be taken to help restore public confidence in government after Watergate.”
Bolstering public credibility in the entire government being beyond the power of legislation, Congress addressed
the particular problem Watergate presented by drafting
legislation whose “basic purpose . . . is to promote public
confidence in the impartial criminal investigation of al143
leged wrongdoings by government officials.

138. Id.
139. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
140. Id. at 810 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986)).
141. Id. at 788, 811–12.
142. Id. at 789, 812.
143. Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 463, 468–69 (1996).
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The structure of the resulting Independent Counsel Statute—a
creative balance between prosecutorial independence and constitutional adherence—was an attempt to address these innate issues.
The Statute included an appointments provision that wrested authority away from the Attorney General and vested it instead with a
144
three-person judicial panel. As noted by Professor Katy Harriger,
by “creating the court panel and giving it the power of appointment, Congress clearly sought to guarantee that the actual conduct
of an investigation and prosecution (if necessary) would be done
145
by an agent largely independent of the Attorney General.” And
though the Attorney General retained removal authority under the
146
Independent Counsel Statute, this power was tempered by two
meaningful limitations. First, the Attorney General could only act
to remove for “good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or
any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of
such independent counsel’s duties.” Second, the Independent

144. The constitutionality of this appointment clause was upheld in Morrison. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (reasoning, in part, that Morrison was “subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official” and was, thus, “to some degree, ‘inferior’ in
rank and authority,”; that she was “empowered . . . to perform only certain, limited duties”
[investigative and prosecution functions]; that her office had a limited investigative jurisdiction; and that the tenure of her office was “limited” and “ ‘temporary’ in the sense that an
independent counsel is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when that task
is over, the office is terminated, either by the counsel herself or by action of the Special Division”).
145. Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs
the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 505 (1998).
146. Morrison upheld the constitutionality of two provisions under the Independent
Counsel Statute that impact the duration of an independent prosecutor’s tenure. First, the
Court considered the constitutionality of § 596(a)(1)’s good cause limitation and found that
this clause did not “unduly trammel” upon the president’s exercise of his executive authority. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–93. Morrison also upheld the constitutionality of a separate provision, § 596(b)(2), which allows for termination of an independent counsel’s activities pursuant to a request by the Attorney General or by the Division of the Court (or “Special
Division”). The Court noted that the authority of the Division of the Court to terminate an
independent prosecution presented a more difficult issue. Yet, in upholding this provision,
the Court reasoned that the Special Division’s role in this process did not constitute “a significant judicial encroachment upon executive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion
of the independent counsel.” Id. at 657. The Court found it significant that a Division of the
Court could terminate only when the office’s duties have either been completed or are virtually completed. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). The Court declared,
as we see it, ‘termination’ may occur only when the duties of the counsel are truly
‘completed’ or ‘so substantially completed’ that there remains no need for any
continuing action by the independent counsel. It is basically a device for removing from the public payroll an independent counsel who has served his or her
purpose but is unwilling to acknowledge the fact. So construed, the Special Division’s power to terminate does not pose a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the Executive’s authority to require that
the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III.
Id. at 682–83.
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Counsel could seek prompt judicial review of any such removal de147
cision in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The codification of a judicial role produced an appointments
and removal process that, at a minimum, was perceptively more
148
impartial. By limiting attorney general influence and introducing
more neutral arbiters, the Statute effectively mitigated the impartiality concerns that were the impetus for its creation. Naturally,
149
members of the judiciary are human and thus subject to biases.
And no proposal can completely immunize any appointment or
removal decision from criticism. Even if Mueller (or any other individual) had been appointed or removed pursuant to these processes, allegations of bias would have likely persisted from either
political party. But what is undeniable is that the appointment and
removal processes under the Independent Counsel Statute are
perceptibly more deliberate and evenhanded than under the current regulations.
Moreover, the Statute’s inclusion of a judicial review mechanism
effectively safeguarded the Independent Counsel from capricious
and unjustified removal actions. Instructive in this regard are insulating measures pursued by members of Congress during Mueller’s
tenure. As indicated, persistent fears of Mueller’s removal caused
concerned senators to introduce various bills designed to protect
the Special Counsel. Notably, every Senate bill contained judicial
150
review provisions, thus exhibiting fidelity to the spirit of the version contained in the Independent Counsel Statute.
147. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
148. Admittedly, my proposal does not preclude the exercise of all attorney general discretion. The current Special Counsel Regulations and the old Independent Counsel Statute
grant the Attorney General discretion to refuse to appoint (or seek the appointment of) a
Special Prosecutor. Attorney General Janet Reno faced blistering criticism from Republican
lawmakers when she refused to seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel in 1997
“to investigate the financing of President Clinton’s re-election campaign.” David Johnston,
Reno Rejects Call to Name a Counsel Over Fund-Raising, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/15/us/reno-rejects-call-to-name-a-counsel-over-fundraising.html [https://perma.cc/H7TL-Z9CX] (noting that Reno stated she had “no specific,
credible evidence that any covered White House official may have committed a Federal
crime in respect of any of these issues”).
149. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 722 (2008); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 782
(2008) (presenting empirical data suggesting that judges’ political preferences influence
their review of agency decisions); Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?:
Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853,
854 (2008).
150. The proposed Special Counsel Integrity Act (Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Sen.
Chris Coons (D-DE)), called for an independent three-judge panel review within 14 days of
any removal action. S. Res. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). It further allowed for an immediate appeal to the Supreme Court. In the event of a judicial finding that removal was unjustified, the Act required that the Special Counsel be immediately reinstated. Another bill, the
Special Counsel Independence Protection Act (Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Sen. Cory
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As noted in Young, it is critical, in light of the significant power
yielded by prosecutors, that “we . . . have assurance that those who
would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of pub151
lic responsibility for the attainment of justice.” Adoption of the
appointment and removal provisions of the lapsed Independent
Counsel Statute would better achieve this critical objective than the
current Special Counsel Regulations. The following Section considers two additional controversies from the Mueller investigation—whether the Special Counsel has the authority to subpoena
and indict a sitting President—and discusses how the existing regulations hamstring a special counsel’s ability to pursue these and related measures. It then introduces a novel remedial approach
which encourages adherence to DOJ policies, yet grants special
prosecutors sufficient autonomy to pursue independent investigations.
C. Subpoena and Indictment of a Sitting President
Mueller sought to interview Trump and engaged in protracted
152
negotiations on the subject that extended for more than a year.
During the pendency of these negotiations, many speculated that
153
Mueller might seek to issue Trump a subpoena ad testificandum.
Whether a sitting president can constitutionally be subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury is an unsettled legal issue. 154 Nevertheless, Supreme Court precedent arguably hints at the possible outcome if the question were to be litigated.

Booker (D-NJ), Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), and Sen. Sidney Blumenthal (D-CT)) required that removal be preceded by a filing of an action by the Attorney General in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as well as the filing of “a contemporaneous notice of the action with the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.” S. Res. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2
(2017). Like the Special Counsel Integrity Act, it required a three-judge panel to adjudicate
the propriety of any removal action. Finally, a consolidated measure—the Special Counsel
Independence and Integrity Act (Sen. Graham, Sen. Coons, Sen. Tillis and Sen. Booker)—
was proposed and set forth protective measures that included both the three-judge panel as
well as the 14-day judicial review provision. H.R. 197, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
151. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).
152. Neuhauser, supra note 111.
153. See, e.g., Glenn Kirschner, Why Hasn’t Robert Mueller Subpoenaed Trump? Three Theories
About the Russia Investigation, NBC NEWS (July 19, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think
/opinion/why-hasn-t-robert-mueller-subpoenaed-trump-three-theories-about-ncna892591
[https://perma.cc/9VWU-PE64].
154. E.g., Sean Illing, Can Mueller Subpoena Trump?, VOX (May 2, 2018), https://www.vox.
com/2018/3/15/16997474/mueller-subpoena-trump-russia-probe (noting the opinions of
various academics regarding whether a subpoena to provide verbal testimony is enforceable
against the president); Kmiec, supra note 109 (explaining that there are valid competing
arguments on each side of the subpoena question).
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In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that President Richard Nixon had to comply with a subpoena duces
155
tecum for the production of White House tapes and documents.
And in Clinton v. Jones, President Bill Clinton was subjected to a civ156
il deposition after an unsuccessful attempt to stay a sexual har157
assment action filed against him by Paula Jones. Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr had also issued a subpoena to Clinton seeking his grand jury testimony as part of the Monica Lewinsky criminal investigation. A negotiated resolution of the matter precluded
158
the constitutional testing of the Starr subpoena, however.
Mueller ultimately elected against the issuance of a subpoena, instead opting to allow Trump to provide written responses to ques159
tions formulated by the Mueller team. During his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Mueller explained that his
decision not to issue a subpoena was motivated by a desire to avoid
a protracted legal battle, which would have compromised the ex160
peditious conclusion of the investigation.
There was also considerable speculation regarding whether
Mueller might indict Trump, as well as meaningful debate on
161
whether such an act would be constitutional. As to the constitutional question, opinion is predictably divided. An array of academics have concluded that sitting presidents are subject to in162
dictment. On the other hand, Trump’s legal team and others in
155. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting Nixon’s claims of executive
privilege and separation of powers).
156. Associated Press, Chronology of the Paula Jones vs. Bill Clinton Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 1988), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/040298
clinton-jones-chronol.html [https://perma.cc/XF45-S3MT] (noting that on January 17,
1997, then-President Clinton had provided deposition testimony in the Paula Jones suit).
157. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705–06 (1997) (“We therefore hold that the doctrine
of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the
President until he leaves office.”).
158. Starr and Clinton agreed the subpoena would be withdrawn in exchange for Clinton’s testimony under certain, specified conditions. Peter Baker, When the President Testified:
People in the Room Recall Clinton’s 1998 Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/us/politics/clinton-testimony-grand-jury.html
[https:
//perma.cc/FB78-RXEW] (describing the events on the day that President Clinton provided his grand jury testimony).
159. See Neuhauser, supra note 111.
160. E.g., David Willman, Mueller Decided Not to Subpoena Trump to Avoid a Lengthy Court
Fight, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-muellersubpoena-20190417-story.html (noting Mueller’s testimony that although he and his team
had viewed as “inadequate” Trump’s written answers, “[w]e . . . weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation, with resulting delay in finishing our investigation,
against the anticipated benefits for our investigation and report”).
161. See Rizzo, supra note 103 (discussing speculation regarding whether Mueller had
the authority to subpoena or indict Trump).
162. E.g., Illing, supra note 104 (noting opinions by various academics). Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Yes, the Constitution Allows Indictment of the President, LAWFARE (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/yes-constitution-allows-indictment-president [https://
perma.cc/U8XB-HDVS] (arguing that Trump should not be shielded from indictment),
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the legal academy, insist that sitting presidents are immune from
163
any and all prosecution. Notably, Trump recently broached a related issue before the Supreme Court. Trump v. Vance stemmed
from a subpoena issued by the Manhattan District Attorney to
Trump’s accounting firm seeking ten years of the President’s tax
164
returns. Before the Second Circuit, Trump argued unsuccessfully that the subpoena should be blocked given the absolute immun165
ity from criminal process he enjoys while in office. A unanimous
court found that “presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state grand jury subpoena directing a third party to
produce non-privileged material, even when the subject matter
166
under investigation pertains to the President.” The court did not
pass judgment on the breadth of the immunity claim advanced by
167
Trump, however.
Before the Supreme Court, Trump advanced the same broad
immunity claim. Trump argued, in part, that he could not “effectively discharge his vast domestic and international duties under
the cloud created by a local prosecutor demanding his personal
168
records and threatening criminal prosecution.” He further submitted that to allow a president to be subject to state and local
prosecution would “risk that politics will lead [such] prosecutors to
with Walter Dellinger, Indicting a President Is Not Foreclosed: The Complex History, LAWFARE
(June 18, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/indicting-president-not-foreclosed-complexhistory [https://perma.cc/N8L3-UWYD] (emphasizing that the question of whether a sitting president can be indicted is “complicated”).
163. See Illing, supra note 104; Nikki Schwab, Giuliani: Trump Couldn’t Be Indicted Even if
He Shot Comey, N.Y. POST (June 3, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/06/03/giuliani-trumpcouldnt-be-indicted-even-if-he-shot-comey/ [https://perma.cc/YAD7-K7DM] (noting Rudy
Giuliani’s comment that “I don’t know how you can indict while he’s in office”); David R.
Lurie, Trump Makes the Argument for an Imperial Presidency, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2019), https:
//slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/trump-imperial-presidency-investigation-immunitynixon.html [https://perma.cc/M6AX-3MRY] (“Trump’s lawyers argued that prosecutors
cannot review his financial records in connection with a criminal investigation so long as he
is in office.”); Kmiec, supra note 109 (arguing that a president cannot be criminally indicted
while in office).
164. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020). There were two separate but related cases
that were also decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as Vance. The two consolidated cases—Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank—pertained to the enforceability of subpoenas issued by House committees for Trump financial records held by thirdparty entities. 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). See Amy Howe, Symposium: Justices to Tackle Disputes over
Access to Trump Financial Records, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com
/2020/03/symposium-justices-to-tackle-disputes-over-access-to-trump-financial-records/
[https://perma.cc/793G-2JLE].
165. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 644–46 (2d Cir. 2019), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020)
(holding unanimously that “any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not
bar the enforcement of such a subpoena”); see also Lurie, supra note 163; Schwab, supra note
163.
166. Vance, 941 F.3d at 640.
167. Id. at 646.
168. Reply Brief of Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 6, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No.
19-635), 2019 WL 6465020.
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169

relentlessly harass the President.” The Supreme Court rejected
Trump’s immunity argument, holding “that the President is neither absolutely immune from state criminal subpoenas seeking his
private papers nor entitled to a heightened standard of need.”170
Mueller ultimately did not seek an indictment against Trump.
With respect to Russian meddling, Mueller found that the Russians
did interfere with the 2016 election, and that there were several
individuals within the Trump campaign with Russian affiliations.
Yet, in the end, Mueller determined that there was insufficient evi171
dence of a coordinated conspiracy. On the issue of obstruction,
however, Mueller’s finding was inconclusive. As noted, the final
Report detailed ten instances of possible obstruction by the Presi172
dent. But Mueller did not reach a definitive conclusion regard173
ing whether sufficient evidence existed to warrant an indictment.
Many questioned why Mueller, after such an extensive investigative
174
effort, did not reach a conclusion on the obstruction issue. In a
news conference held on May 29, 2019, Mueller cited two primary
169. Howe, supra note 164.
170. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020).
171. Mueller Finds No Collusion with Russia, Leaves Obstruction Question Open, AM. BAR ASS’N
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives
/2019/03/mueller-concludes-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/P9MP-ELZW]
(noting
Mueller “found that Russia did interfere with the election, but ‘did not find that the Trump
campaign, or anyone associated with it, conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in these efforts, despite multiple efforts from Russian-affiliated individuals to assist the
Trump campaign.’ ”).
172. See supra notes 16, 108 and accompanying text.
173. Following the Report’s release, Mueller publicly stated that, “[a]s set forth in the
report, after that investigation, if we had had confidence that the president clearly did not
commit a crime, we would have said so. We did not, however, make a determination as to
whether the president did commit a crime.” Full Transcript of Mueller’s Statement on Russia
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/politics
/mueller-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/HYG2-5P5Z] [hereinafter Full Transcript].
174. Randall D. Eliason, Why Didn’t Barr Order Mueller to Make the Call on Obstruction?,
WASH. POST (May 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/02/whydidnt-barr-order-mueller-make-call-obstruction/ [https://perma.cc/6LUM-7BYC] (stating
that Barr should have instructed Mueller to make a finding on obstruction prior to the
submission of the final report); see also Andrew Prokop, Mueller’s Punt Keeps Looking Worse,
VOX (May 31, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/31/18645173
/mueller-report-barr-trump-obstruction (noting that Mueller’s indecision “took some constitutional scholars and Justice Department veterans by surprise”); David A. Sklansky, Stanford Law’s David Sklansky on Mueller Report and AG Barr Conclusions, STAN. L. SCH. LEGAL
AGGREGATE (Apr. 18, 2019), https://law.stanford.edu/2019/04/18/stanford-laws-davidsklansky-on-mueller-report-and-ag-barr-conclusions/ [https://perma.cc/XQE3-47SZ] (asserting that the evidence of obstruction was “pretty damning”). Compare Christina Pazzanese,
Parsing the Mueller Report, HARV. GAZETTE (Apr. 18, 2019), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette
/story/2019/04/harvard-professor-mueller-found-substantial-evidence-of-obstruction-ofjustice/ [https://perma.cc/GV89-63MS] (arguing that Mueller’s indecision on the obstruction question is “defensible” despite there being sufficient evidence of obstruction) with Jack
Goldsmith, The Mueller Report’s Weak Statutory Interpretation Analysis, LAWFARE (May 11, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/mueller-reports-weak-statutory-interpretation-analysis [https:
//perma.cc/XH7G-45JA] (arguing that Trump did not obstruct justice and thus did not
commit any crimes).
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reasons, fairness to the President and DOJ policy, which prohibits
the indictment of a sitting president:
[U]nder longstanding department policy, a president cannot be charged with a federal crime while he is in office.
That is unconstitutional. Even if the charge is kept under
seal and hidden from public view, that, too, is prohibited. A
special counsel’s office is part of the Department of Justice,
and by regulation, it was bound by that department policy.
Charging the president with a crime was therefore not an
option we could consider . . . And beyond department policy, we were guided by principles of fairness. It would be unfair to potentially . . . accuse somebody of a crime when
there can be no court resolution of the actual charge. 175
As an employee of the Justice Department, Mueller was bound
to follow DOJ policies. DOJ policies disallow the indictment of a
sitting president and, as will be briefly discussed later, discourage
176
the issuance of a subpoena to an investigative target. In the end,
Mueller’s investigative and prosecutorial hands were proverbially
tied. There was little wiggle room. Unable to act beyond the strictures of DOJ rules and regulations, the Mueller investigation was
hardly independent. This was Mueller’s reality, and actions undertaken by the DOJ since the conclusion of the Mueller investigation
(e.g., Barr’s four-page summary of the Mueller report, Barr’s appointment of prosecutors to investigate the Michael Flynn prosecution and the FBI’s probe of the Trump campaign, and the Department’s revised sentencing recommendation in the Roger
Stone case) only reinforced the perception among many that the
177
DOJ was functioning as an advocate for the President.
175. See Full Transcript, supra note 173 (providing the complete transcript of Mueller’s
statement after the release of the final report).
176. See discussion infra Section II.D.2.
177. E.g., Katie Benner & Sharon LaFraniere, Justice Dept. Moves to Drop Charges Against
Russian Firms Filed by Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/03/16/us/politics/concord-case-russian-interference.html [https://perma.cc/Y9K2-96HY]
(“Democrats in Congress have accused Attorney General William P. Barr of trying to undo
the work of the special counsel. They cite Mr. Barr’s appointment of a prosecutor to investigate whether the F.B.I. abused its power in investigating the Trump campaign, his intervention in the sentencing of the Trump associate Roger J. Stone Jr. and his installation of an
outside prosecutor to review the case against Michael T. Flynn, President Trump’s former
national security adviser.”); see also Mark Sumner, William Barr Officially Becomes Trump’s Personal Attorney—With Power to Persecute or Pardon Anyone, DAILY KOS (Feb. 12, 2020), https://
www.dailykos.com/stories/2020/2/12/1918652/-William-Barr-officially-becomes-Trumps-personal-attorney-with-power-to-persecute-or-pardon-anyone [https://perma.cc/9VDCLC4X] (“Barr has taken ‘control of legal matters of personal interest to President Donald
Trump.’ That includes persecution of Trump’s enemies, such as former acting FBI Director
Andrew McCabe. That includes protecting Trump allies such as Roger Stone and Michael
Flynn. Barr isn’t turning the Justice Department into a political instrument—he’s already
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Public trust in criminal investigations of executive branch
wrongdoing requires prosecutorial independence. To further this
critical objective, an investigative and prosecutorial structure must
be implemented that grants a prosecutor sufficient latitude to pursue independent investigations, while reigning in the exercise of
runaway discretion. As noted by former Senators Robert Dole and
George Mitchell, “[t]he challenge of any system for independent
or special counsel is to strike the right balance between sufficient
independence and sufficient accountability, so the public is as178
sured that an inquiry is both credibly and responsibly resolved.”
It is this balance that has thus far been elusive. This Article’s proposal fills the gap.
Whereas the current Special Counsel Regulations strictly enforce compliance with DOJ policies, the Independent Counsel
Statute’s restrictions on activity were comparatively toothless. For
example, § 594(f) required an Independent Counsel to comply
with DOJ policies, “except to the extent that to do so would be in179
consistent with the purposes of this chapter.” The section, however, was devoid of any meaningful oversight or enforcement
mechanism. Indeed, former Special Prosecutor Robert Fiske observed that
there are no such checks or balances in the case of the independent counsel who, once appointed, has all of the authority of the Attorney General and the independent counsel doesn’t have to seek authority from anybody to do
anything. He or she can do whatever they feel is appropri180
ate, without any review by anyone.

done that. He’s using his role to create revisionist history and to actively support and generate nothing less than corruption.”).
178. ROBERT DOLE & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, AM. ENTER. INST. & BROOKINGS INST.,
PROJECT ON THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS V (May
1999), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/icreport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T4UQ-9A3F] (this report was prepared by the former senators at the behest of
the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, reviewing the Independent
Counsel Statute and setting forth various recommendations for reform).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1994).
180. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III & T.S. Ellis, III, The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken
and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1546 (1997). Fiske was appointed
as Special Prosecutor by Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate President Clinton and
his wife Hillary’s relationship with the Whitewater Development Corporation and Madison
Guaranty Savings and Loan. See Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel,
WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/08
/06/judges-replace-fiske-as-whitewater-counsel/4ca08c66-62cd-4ef3-a44f-9835399ed0ee/
[https://perma.cc/BJF6-YHUJ].
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Such concerns ultimately contributed to the demise of the In181
dependent Counsel Statute. In 1997, Fiske expressed a preference that the Independent Counsel Statute be amended but
opined that attaining the delicate balance between prosecutorial
182
accountability and independence might be impractical. This Article submits that this delicate balance can be achieved through
statutory modification. By keeping the existing structure and adding a judicial function consistent with the dictates of Morrison v. Ol183
son, the Independent Counsel Statute can effectively restrain
wayward prosecutorial activity within the context of an independent investigation.
D. Proposal to Modify the Expired Independent Counsel Statute
Specifically, this Article proposes that Independent Counsels be
required to abide by the following two-pronged procedure. First,
whenever an Independent Counsel seeks to pursue a course of action that implicates a reporting, consulting, or approval provision
184
contained in the Justice Manual, the Independent Counsel must
185
abide by those policies and procedures. If approval is obtained,
then the Independent Counsel may proceed with the proposed
course of action. If, on the other hand, the proposed action is not
approved, then the Independent Counsel has two options: either
abide by the DOJ determination or present the request to the Division of the Court. In the event the Independent Counsel pursues a
review with the Division of the Court, the DOJ would be afforded
the opportunity to appear and present its arguments in opposition.
181. E.g., CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44857, SPECIAL
COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 8 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44857.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q6P-J837] (“[C]oncerns
over whether the independent counsel possessed too much power, which arose after the
extensive independent counsel investigations of the Iran-Contra affair and the Whitewater
controversy, resulted in the law’s ultimate expiration and nonrenewal in 1999.”).
182. See Wilkinson, III & Ellis, III, supra note 180, at 1550.
183. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988). See supra note 57 for a
brief discussion of Morrison.
184. My proposal also extends to DOJ policies not delineated in the Justice Manual, such
as the Department’s policy against indicting sitting presidents. For more information on the
Justice Manual, see infra notes 187–94 and accompanying text.
185. My proposal does not intend to subject the Special Counsel to every provision of
the Justice Manual. Rather, only those Justice Manual criminal provisions that are consistent
with Morrison would require the Special Counsel’s compliance. Thus, a Special Counsel
should be subject to only those Justice Manual provisions that impose obligations that can
be classified as “passive,” “ministerial,” “directly analogous to functions that federal judges
perform in other contexts,” and that do not “unduly interfer[e] with the role of the Executive Branch.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 (1988); see also, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE
MANUAL § 9-11.140 (2018) [hereinafter J.M.] (requiring DOJ approval prior to “initiating
any process to obtain testimony or evidence from abroad”). It is beyond the scope of this
Article to develop a comprehensive listing.
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If the Independent Counsel’s request is approved, then he could
186
proceed accordingly.
1. Justice Manual Overview
The Justice Manual contains the internal policies and procedures of the DOJ and delineates the guidance requirements that
187
Department prosecutors must abide by in certain situations.
Formerly known as the United States Attorneys Manual, the Justice
Manual serves as “a valuable means of improving efficiency, promoting consistency, and ensuring that applicable Department policies remain readily available to all employees as they carry out the
188
Department’s vital mission.” DOJ prosecutors enjoy discretion
with regard to investigative, prosecutorial, and appellate matters
189
that are comparatively routine. For such matters, the provisions
of the Justice Manual merely provide guidelines. But for matters
that are less routine or implicate significant interests or concerns,
DOJ prosecutors must consult with the Justice Manual prior to un190
dertaking the proposed action.
2. Subpoenaing Targets
Consider, for example, section 9-11.150, Subpoenaing Targets of
191
the Investigation. This provision recognizes the government’s
well-established authority to issue grand jury subpoenas to investi186. Cook, III, supra note 35, at 330–31 n.276.
187. J.M., supra note 185, at §§ 1-1.100–.200.
188. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Affs., Department of Justice Announces
the Rollout of an Updated United States Attorneys’ Manual (Sept. 25, 2018), https:
//www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-rollout-updated-united-statesattorneys-manual [https://perma.cc/J6UB-SMXV] (quoting Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein).
189. J.M., supra note 185, at § 9-2.001.
190. See supra notes 40, 187 and accompanying text.
191. J.M., supra note 185, at § 9-11.150. Section 9-11.150 is just one of an array of Justice
Manual provisions that require DOJ approval or consultation with respect to pretrial investigative strategies of federal prosecutors. A sampling of others include section 9-13.410, which
requires DOJ approval prior to issuing a grand jury subpoena “to an attorney for information relating to the representation of a client”; section 9-13.400, which requires approval
from the Attorney General for “the use of certain law enforcement tools to obtain information from, or records of, a member of the news media”; section 9-2.136(H), which “presumptively require[s DOJ approval] for certain court actions involving the international terrorism-focused . . . statutes,” such as submitting a search warrant application or seeking an
indictment; section 9-7.200, which requires department approval for “video surveillance . . .
when there is a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy requiring judicial authorization”; section 9-11.260, which requires department approval prior to seeking the release of
grand jury materials; and finally, sections 9-16.010 and 9-16.015, which require department
approval prior to the entry of pleas of nolo contendere and Alford pleas.
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192

gative targets. It also acknowledges, however, the perceptive risks
193
and the futile outcomes that often accompany such subpoenas.
Though the section plainly encourages caution, it does not foreclose the practice altogether. Instead, it sets forth a process requiring clearance from either “the United States Attorney or the responsible Assistant Attorney General.” The pertinent part of the
section provides:
[I]n the context of particular cases such a subpoena may
carry the appearance of unfairness. Because the potential
for misunderstanding is great, before a known “target” . . .
is subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury about his or
her involvement in the crime under investigation, an effort
should be made to secure the target’s voluntary appearance. If a voluntary appearance cannot be obtained, the
target should be subpoenaed only after the United States
Attorney or the responsible Assistant Attorney General have
approved the subpoena. In determining whether to approve a subpoena for a “target,” careful attention will be
paid to the following considerations:
•
•
•

The importance to the successful conduct of the
grand jury’s investigation of the testimony or other information sought;
Whether the substance of the testimony or other information sought could be provided by other witnesses; and
Whether the questions the prosecutor and the grand
jurors intend to ask or the other information sought
194
would be protected by a valid claim of privilege.

Given Trump’s intransigence, there was considerable speculation regarding why Mueller did not opt to simply issue a subpoe195
na. After all, for over a year, the Mueller and Trump teams en-

192. Id.
193. See Kirschner, supra note 153 (“[A] guiding principle of grand jury practice is that
prosecutors generally do not subpoena targets. This is because it would be futile to subpoena a target only to have that witness refuse to testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment. This
principle is a corollary to the bedrock trial principle that a defendant has an absolute right
not to testify at his own trial. Prosecutors generally avoid trying to force defendants to incriminate themselves via a grand jury.”).
194. J.M., supra note 185, at §9-11.150.
195. Kirschner, supra note 153 (offering various theories to explain Mueller’s failure to
issue a subpoena); Philip Rucker, Carol D. Leonnig, Josh Dawsey & Matt Zapotosky, How
Trump Dodged a Special Counsel Interview—And a Subpoena Fight, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-trump-mueller-interview-subpoena-2019
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gaged in negotiations that ultimately failed to secure a voluntary
196
interview. During the course of these conversations, an agreement was reached for Trump to provide written responses to
197
Mueller’s inquiries. In testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, however, Mueller expressed his dissatisfaction with
Trump’s responses, and his final report indicated that Trump
failed to respond to any of Mueller’s questions that pertained to
198
the issue of obstruction.
Publicly, Mueller stated that he had the authority to issue a subpoena but that he elected against doing so given his desire to avoid
199
protracted litigation and further extending the investigation.
Maybe so. Yet, it is not unreasonable to wonder why under these
circumstances Mueller elected to fold his tent rather than pursue a
subpoena strategy. Perhaps Mueller’s decision was influenced by
the section 9-11.150 review process. Maybe it was directly or indirectly communicated that the DOJ disfavored this approach and
that securing a voluntary commitment for a Trump interview was
his best alternative under the circumstances. After all, during this
period, Rosenstein, who was Mueller’s superior, “was under intense
200
political pressure.” Like Mueller, Rosenstein had been the sub201
ject of persistent dismissal rumors. And he was also a target of
House Republicans who had openly discussed the possibility of
202
Rosenstein’s impeachment. All speculation aside, what is clear is
that Mueller did not have the option of judicial review—an option
that could have potentially influenced the direction of his subpoena strategy.
3. Individual Targets
The Justice Manual contains a host of provisions that cover the
gamut of situations that a prosecutor may encounter. Some ad0328-story.html (“[T]he decision not to subpoena the president is one of the lingering mysteries of Mueller’s 22-month investigation.”).
196. Full Text of Mueller’s Questions and Trump’s Answers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 18,
2019), https://apnews.com/98f22511be924ced895ce5c0bfedfe37 [https://perma.cc/PKN9CMHW].
197. Id.
198. Id.; Eric Lach, Robert Mueller Let Donald Trump Duck Direct Questions About Obstruction,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/current/robert-muellerlet-donald-trump-duck-direct-questions-about-obstruction [https://perma.cc/5J49-F2U7].
199. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
200. Rucker et. al, supra note 195 (“Rosenstein himself was under intense political pressure: Trump mused about firing the onetime George W. Bush appointee . . . whom he derided at one point as ‘the Democrat from Baltimore.’ And House conservatives threatened
to impeach Rosenstein, accusing him of withholding information about the Russia probe.”).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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dress specific categories of individuals and detail the consultation
or approval processes that must be followed before certain investigative and prosecutorial strategies can be pursued. For example,
section 9-85.110 requires consultation with the Public Integrity
Section in “all investigations involving a Member of Congress or
203
congressional staff member.” The provision provides that consultation is required prior to interviewing or subpoenaing such indi204
viduals or applying for certain search warrants. Section 9-16.110
requires prior approval from the Public Integrity Section before
plea agreements can be entered into “with defendants who are
205
candidates or members of Congress or federal judges.”
Additionally, section 9-7.302 provides that requests to monitor
oral communications (in the absence of the consent of all parties)
“when it is known that the monitoring concerns an investigation
into an allegation of misconduct committed by a Member of Congress, a federal judge, a member of the Executive Branch at Executive Level IV or above (as defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 5312–5315), or a
person who has served in such capacity within the previous two
years” must be approved by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 206
And subsection (A)(2) requires the same consultation when the
monitoring pertains to “the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Attorney General of any State or Territory, or a judge or justice of the
highest court of any State or Territory, and the offense investigated
is one involving bribery, conflict of interest, or extortion relating to
the performance of his or her official duties.” 207
There is no Justice Manual provision that specifically addresses
the propriety of indicting a current U.S. President. As noted, however, a DOJ policy nevertheless exists that prohibits such indict208
ments. Thus, no indictment against Trump was forthcoming on a
possible conspiracy charge, obstruction charge, or anything else. It
was never in the cards. The most aggressive posture Mueller could
203. J.M., supra note 185, at § 9-85.110.
204. Id. (“In particular, the Public Integrity Section must be consulted prior to taking
any of the following steps: (1) interviewing a Member of Congress or congressional staff
member; (2) subpoenaing a Member of Congress or congressional staff member; or (3) applying for a search warrant for a location or device in which legislative materials are likely to
be found. In addition, consensual monitoring in an investigation involving allegations of
misconduct by a Member of Congress requires approval by a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General.”).
205. Id. § 9-16.110 (stating that the concern underlying the prior approval mandate is
“[t]o assure uniformity and fairness.”).
206. Id. § 9-7.302 (providing that monitoring of oral communications “[i]n all other investigations involving a Member of Congress or congressional staff” requires consultation
with the Public Integrity Section) (emphasis added).
207. Id. § 9-7.302(A)(2) (requiring that prior “authorization to monitor an oral communication without the consent of all parties to the communication must be approved in writing by the Director of the Office of Enforcement Operations” of the Criminal Division).
208. See, e.g., Touchberry, supra note 108.
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theoretically have taken would have been to prepare a final report
with a firmly stated conclusion regarding the President’s criminality. But Mueller felt constrained from even doing that much given
the Department’s policy and fairness considerations to the President.
Attorney General Barr expressed surprise that Mueller failed to
209
reach a decision on the obstruction question. But Mueller’s nuanced approach to Trump’s criminal culpability was certainly defensible in light of the circumstances of the report’s preparation.
210
Mueller’s subtlety certainly had its virtues. In the end, however,
the Mueller probe was adversely influenced by a binding policy
that inevitably compromised its final product. After a nearly twoyear investigation, the public was provided with a partly inconclusive final report that was summarized shortly after its release by an
Attorney General “who, before his appointment, called Mueller’s
211
obstruction-of-justice theories ‘fatally misconceived.’” It was a
conclusion that yearns for a rewrite.
The proposal set forth in this Article affords future Independent
Counsels freedoms that are nonexistent in the current Special
Counsel Regulations. And in so doing, it provides prosecutors who
conclude that a president has committed an indictable offense the
209. Alan Neuhauser, Barr Surprised Mueller Didn’t Decide on Obstruction, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 1, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-0501/attorney-general-william-barr-surprised-robert-mueller-didnt-decide-on-obstruction (noting Barr’s claim that he and others at the DOJ were surprised when Mueller did not reach a
conclusion on the obstruction matter); see also Katie Benner, Barr Escalates Criticism of Mueller
Team and Defends Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31
/us/politics/barr-mueller-team.html [https://perma.cc/R7XZ-J53G] (“Mr. Barr also said
that Mr. Mueller was wrong to not make a decision . . . [regarding] criminal obstruction of
justice, echoing his statement to Congress that Mr. Mueller ‘shouldn’t have investigated’ the
president if he was not willing to ‘go down the path of making a traditional prosecutive decision.’ ”).
210. See, e.g., Daniel W. Drezner, In Defense of Robert Mueller, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/19/defense-robert-mueller/ [https://
perma.cc/4VUS-A94Q] (“Mueller perfectly fits the mold of public servants that [are] ‘generally not all that interested in partisan politics but are deeply committed to the process and
substance of good government.’ Indeed, Mueller proved himself to be far better at draining
the swamp than Trump ever was.”); Renato Mariotti, Actually, Robert Mueller Was Awesome,
POLITICO (July 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/07/25/robertmueller-hearing-was-awesome-227478 [https://perma.cc/3TLN-WAJE] (“Mueller famously
said that he was ‘unable’ to state that Trump ‘clearly did not commit obstruction of justice,’
and thus his report ‘does not exonerate’ Trump. This . . . is a very careful approach that
permitted Mueller to be as fair as possible to Trump under the circumstances.”).
211. Eliason, supra note 174 (“Instead, the public was left with the opinion of the president’s attorney general—a man who . . . had Mueller’s report for only a brief time, and who,
according to his testimony on Wednesday, did not review the underlying evidence.”); see also
Eli Watkins, Barr Authored Memo Last Year Ruling Out Obstruction of Justice, CNN (Mar. 26,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/24/politics/barr-memo-mueller/index.html [https:
//perma.cc/Q7ZQ-SQME] (“Nearly a year before his letter Sunday telling lawmakers he did
not believe President Donald Trump committed obstruction of justice, Attorney General
William Barr authored a memo saying he thought the obstruction investigation was ‘fatally
misconceived.’ ”).
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opportunity to argue constitutionally related questions before the
212
Division of the Court. The liberty to possibly venture outside the
sanctum of DOJ policies not only enhances the public trust, but it
furthers the likelihood of the impartial exercise of prosecutorial
practice.
4. Specific Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
In addition to Justice Manual provisions and departmental policies that address specified classes of individuals, there are also a
myriad of provisions directed to specific criminal investigations
and prosecutions. In these instances, a government prosecutor—or
an Independent Counsel pursuant to this proposal—must obtain
prior approval before she can undertake certain actions. For example, department approval is required “prior to seeking an in213
dictment for a capital-eligible offense,” prior to filing charges
214
under the Economic Espionage Act, and prior to seeking an in215
dictment alleging Airport Sabotage. In addition, “prior concurrence of the [Associate Attorney General is required] before entering into a plea agreement in a torture, war crimes, [or]
216
genocide . . . matter,” and the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of the Criminal Division must be notified prior to
“open[ing] any torture, war crimes, genocide, child soldiers mat217
ter, or female genital mutilation” investigation.
Another such provision—notable for its arguable connection to
President Trump—is section 9-85.210, which requires consultation
“in all federal criminal matters that focus on violations of federal
or state campaign finance laws, federal patronage crimes, and cor-

212. To date, the constitutional question regarding the indictability of a sitting president
remains unsettled. Whenever the issue is determined, it will not be on account of a persuasive internal DOJ policy memorandum. Rather, it will be settled by the judiciary. Deciding
matters regarding the propriety of indictments is a function that is routinely performed by
the judiciary (e.g., bills of particulars; vindictive prosecution; selective prosecution; improper joinder of parties; improper joinder of persons, etc.).
213. J.M., supra note 185, at § 9-10.060 (mandating submission of a case for review at
least 90 days prior to the submission of its notice to seek the death penalty, but allowing for
extenuating circumstances (e.g. speedy trial compliance, public safety concerns, need for
additional information)—that may excuse prior approval).
214. Id. § 9-59.000 (requiring approval of the Assistant Attorney General for the National
Security Division).
215. Id. § 9-63.221 (requiring prior authorization from the Assistant Attorney General of
the Criminal Division).
216. Id. § 9-2.139(F) (allowing for the Deputy Attorney General to resolve disagreements
in the event the Assistant Attorney General does not concur with the plea proposal).
217. Id. § 9-2.139(C) (requiring that the notification “include the names and identifiers,
if known, of the subjects of the investigation and a general overview of the investigation”).

438

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:2

218

ruption of the electoral process.” Consider the case of Michael
Cohen, who was a personal attorney for President Trump, and pled
guilty and is serving a sentence for, inter alia, violating federal
219
campaign finance laws. In 2016, Cohen made monetary payments to two women who claimed to have had affairs with
220
Trump. The purpose of the payments were to keep the women
221
quiet so as to not jeopardize Trump’s election chances. Before
Congress, Cohen testified that he made the payments at the behest
of the President. 222 The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York, which had been investigating the matter, recently terminated its investigation without bringing charges. 223 Had
an Independent Counsel, as opposed to the Southern District,
been charged with this campaign finance investigation, he would
have been subject to section 9-85.210’s consultation requirements
but, under this Article’s proposal, would have also had the option
to obtain a review by the Division of the Court.
The Justice Manual thus provides a comprehensive catalog of
provisions that effectively regulate federal prosecutorial conduct. It
details policies and procedures that guide prosecutor behavior in a
myriad of contexts. And in the manner set forth in this Article’s
proposal, the Justice Manual can also be used as a critical check
upon the investigative and prosecutorial discretion exercised by
218. Id. § 9-85.210 (mandating consultation with the Public Integrity Section “before any
inquiry or preliminary investigation is requested or conducted.” The section further requires consultation prior to “instituting grand jury proceedings, filing an information, or
seeking an indictment charging a campaign financing crime.”).
219. Matt Zapotosky, Prosecutors Have ‘Concluded’ Michael Cohen Campaign Finance Probe,
Judge Says, WASH. POST (July 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security
/prosecutors-have-concluded-michael-cohen-campaign-finance-probe-judge-says/2019/07
/17/733391a0-a8b1-11e9-9214-246e594de5d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/5LLC-MZMR]
(noting Cohen’s guilty plea and sentence of three years in prison).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. David A. Sklansky, Cohen, Trump, and Campaign Finance Violations, STAN. L. SCH.
LEGAL AGGREGATE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/08/22/cohen-trumpand-campaign-finance-violations/ [https://perma.cc/4DMY-PTKE] (“Trump is directly incriminated. Cohen said in court that he made the payments at Trump’s direction. Actually,
what Cohen said was that he arranged the payments ‘in coordination with and at the direction of a candidate for federal office,’ but it’s clear that the candidate was Trump.”); see also
Michael D. Shear, Testimony from Cohen Could Compound Legal Issues for Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/politics/congressionaltestimony-cohen.html [https://perma.cc/3LLP-G4ZQ] (discussing Cohen’s congressional
testimony); Ben Protess, William K. Rashbaum & Benjamin Weiser, Investigation into Trump
Campaign Finance Violations Is Over, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/nyregion/michael-cohen-trump-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/ZU4P-FJBH] (indicating that federal prosecutors had concluded their
investigation into the campaign finance allegations but that there was no indication whether
the prosecutors intended to file additional charges).
223. Kevin Breuninger & Dan Mangan, Feds End Probe of Hush Money that Trump Lawyer
Michael Cohen Directed to Stormy Daniels, Karen McDougal, CNBC (July 17, 2019), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/feds-end-probe-of-hush-money-that-trump-ex-lawyer-michaelcohen-directed.html [https://perma.cc/A5YL-Y844].
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Independent Counsels. But it is the availability of judicial review in
constitutionally appropriate contexts that will allow Independent
Counsels the freedom to pursue practices and strategies that are
lacking in the current Special Counsel Regulations. Without such
independence, the public’s trust in criminal investigations of executive branch wrongdoing cannot be restored.
CONCLUSION
What is imperative in a criminal justice system is the administration
of impartial justice. To obtain the public’s trust, the administration
of justice must be fair in appearance and in fact. In this regard,
224
the actions of the judiciary, the litigants—the prosecution in par225
ticular —and federal and state legislatures are of inestimable influence. This country’s extensive struggle with these issues has
manifested itself in countless forms, including, but not limited to,
226
judicial rulings and an array of legislative reforms that have ad227
dressed racial, ethnic, and gender inequities in the system.
224. For an extensive academic discussion of the critical influence of the judiciary in the
impartial administration of justice, see Peter David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 890–91 (1996) (“Courts have also recognized that in a criminal
jury trial due process requires the absence of actual judicial bias toward the defendant. Professors Redish and Marshall have suggested that the appearance or ‘perception’ of fairness
in the courtroom is perhaps the most important or ‘core’ value of procedural due process. . . . Due process not only requires, therefore, that trial judges be fair and impartial, but
it also demands that they ‘satisfy the appearance of justice.’ Simply put, a trial judge’s appearance, conduct, and behavior in a criminal jury trial must never indicate to the jury that
the judge believes the accused to be guilty.”). See generally U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES ch. 2, Canon 2A (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5DV-T9J5] (admonishing judges to “respect and comply with the law
and . . . act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.”).
225. See notes 29–31 and accompanying text; J.M., supra note 185, at §9-5.001 (instructing prosecutors to provide discovery beyond what is constitutionally required, adding that
“[b]y doing so, prosecutors will ensure confidence in fair trials and verdicts”). For commentary questioning the ability of prosecutors to carry out these ethical prescriptions, see Abbe
Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor? 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 382
(2001) (“[P]rosecutors are in the business of judging, of upholding standards, of exacting
penance. To prosecutors, luck is irrelevant. People make choices. The humility and liberation that defenders experience when they connect with a client may be antithetical to what
prosecutors need to do. Compassion, while laudable, may not be something prosecutors can
afford on a regular basis.”).
226. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has been at the heart of
many of these decisions. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting the
exercise of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on account of race).
227. Recent legislative reforms include the First Step Act of 2018 that contains various
provisions related to sentencing reform and, inter alia, eased the application of mandatory
minimum penalties. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF
2018: AN OVERVIEW (2019).
In addition, many states have recently implemented reforms to their cash bail systems.
See generally The State of Bail Reform, MARSHALL PROJECT: THE SYS. (Oct. 30, 2020),
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In the context of alleged executive branch corruption, the Watergate saga gave rise in 1978 to the Independent Counsel Statute,
which was an attempt to attain a more impartial investigative and
228
prosecutorial process. Today, the Mueller investigation and the
persistent and various interventions by President Trump and Attorney General Barr in executive branch criminal matters counsel
a similar response. In essence, history has repeated itself and it is
essential that Congress, once again, be mindful of this fact and respond with appropriate legislation.
Public trust demands that our country continuously strive to rid
our criminal justice system of its many imperfections. It is something we must do and never stop trying to achieve. Yet, I suspect
that in the limited context of this Article, it is impossible to craft a
process that is free of controversy or close to perfect in execution.
229
The Independent Counsel Statute was an imperfect solution, and
the idea this Article proposes—a return to the Statute with modifications—does not correct, or even intend to address, all of the ills
associated with it. Discretion still exists with respect to appointment. The Division of the Court may still select Independent
Counsels with biases. Members of Congress will still urge investigations that are unjust. Attorney Generals may refuse to investigate
and appoint Independent Counsels when the allegations of misconduct are meritorious. Discretion still exists in terms of what to
charge, whom to charge, and which plea packages to offer. And
there is still the problem of investigative duration and associated
costs.
Yet the Independent Counsel Statute, with all its shortcomings,
was better than the system that preceded it, and it is superior to the
one currently in existence. When the executive branch is tasked
with the charge of investigating criminal activity within its own
ranks, the process, at a minimum, is perceptively unfair. Though
not a cure-all, a return to the Independent Counsel Statute with
the modifications suggested in this Article will significantly mitigate
the problems embedded in the Special Counsel Regulations. It
protects against the exercise of runaway prosecutorial discretion,
grants Independent Counsels the latitude to periodically pursue
practices beyond those authorized by the DOJ, and ultimately creates a more legitimate process both in appearance and in fact.

www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/30/the-state-of-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/LT9VYMN3] (detailing the reform efforts of various states).
228. See notes 41–42 and accompanying text; Cook, III, supra note 35, 291–93 (detailing
the events predating the Independent Counsel Statute).
229. Julian A, Cook, III, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Premature Demise, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 1367, 1384–87 (1999) (noting various objections to the statute).

